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CHAPTER I
A BACKGROUlID STUDY OF THE MOROCCAN SITUATIOJ'

Morocoo, or Maghreb-el-Ak.a--the ley ot the West --i8 a oountry in
ortheastern Atrioa, acrolS the Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar.

Some

i.torians olaim that it il the mOlt desirable ot the North African oountrie.,
oause ot it. fertility, its natural resouroes, and it.

geogr~phioal

position.

it i. alightly larger than France, and its population in 1904 was
bout tive ml11ion.

Tbe ollmate 1, plea.ant, and due to the rioh Boil of tbe

alleys and plain., agriculture i8 one ot its chiet ocoupation..

Every known

riety of vegetable and grain can be raised there, and Mcrocco could ea8i1y
upply all the market. ot Europe with early spring vegetable •• l
The Atlas mountains shelter the country from winds, storms, and the
at ot the desert.

BecaU8e the mountain pasture. are among the fine.t

grazing distriots ot the world, the sheep industry i8 very important.

Not

only have the mountains attected the climate and industry of the oountry, but
they have exercised a ~reat intluenoe upon the history and government of
Moroooo.

Slnoe aeveral mountain ohains eros. the country, the division ot t

country into numerous provinoes has prevented the organization of a well
united government.

Thus, it 18 not surprising to tind tribal independenoe,

1 w. D. Harris, Intervention ~ Colonization ~ Atrica, BOlton,
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914, 243.
1

2

local jealousies and personal rivalries existing in Morocco.
No doubt this disunity is further acoentuated by the lack ot good
roads and ot modern means of transportation.

Hindered thus by the mountain

ohains and poor transportation, the central government of Maghzen haa been
unable to subjeot the barbarous Berber tribes in the mountaina, or the Arabs
and Koor. in the plains. Aotually, only a certain number of tribes were
direotly aubjeot to the Sultan, while the others were a law unto the.elvel.
What then was the great attraotion held by European countries tor
Morocco! Was it the arricultural products'

Its sheep industry'

It.

geographical importance7
Whatever the annar may be. it is true that in the early twentieth
~entury

several European oGuntriea were

loo~inr

longingly at Morocco.

Beginning with the 1870' s there • • a renewed intereat in overseas expansion
~mong

the leading oountries of Europe.

This followed a period trom 1840 to

870 when there ftl a marked dec11ne of European impedalie.

.A. tew

xceptiona oharaoterize thia time, luoh aa Napoleon IIIta eftorts to

~38~re~t

oolonial empire for France, and a few additions made by the British in India.
~ut

generally speaking, wide-spread colonial expansion was laoking.
A favorite explanation of why European imperialism resumed in the

870' a i. an eoonomic one, baled on the following statement.

It was advanoed originally by publioiltl and statesmen to win the support
of business interests for imperalistio polioies. Marxian writers took up
the argument and integrated it with their dogma ot materialistic
determination, reasoning then that, imperialism ts an ir1lJl'ltable phase in
the evolution of capitalism, a phase in which 8urplu8 capital, accumulated
. by the exploration ot domestio labor, 1s obliged by diminishing returns

3

.,

at home to find new outlet. for investment abroad. 2
"'hiB new imperialism then would be one of investinr a8 well as one
of oolonizing.

To oarry the economio argument further, some olaim that the

need of raw materials neoessitated the aoquisition of new oolonie ••
HoweTer, this argument, based solely on eoonomic reasons, would seem
to

rln~

false when the

fGllowin~

conditions are considered.

RU8sia and Italy

participated in the 8cramb1e for colonies, although they had no surplus
manufaotured ,:oods to sell, nor surplus money to invest.
who greatly exoeeded France in industrial deTelopment,

_8

LikeTliae, Germany,
tar outdistanced

by France in aoquiring more territory.

Baaically, then, the new imperialism _, a nationalistio phenomenon.
It was a psychological reaction to maintain or reCOTer natiomal pre8ti~e.3
Such seemed to be the cale of England, who, isolated in Europa,

would enlarge

the Dritish Empire J of France who, ha"inr, suffered losses in Em·ope, would
turn elsewhere for oompensation, ot Ru.. !a who, halted in the Balkans, would
alain turn to Asia. of Germany and Italy Who, haTing united their oountries,
wished to extend their prestige OTeraeas.
~ho

It _s then only those oountries

_nted to increase their powerful position in the eyes of the world that

joined this imperialistic race, the oountries without prestige were noticeably
absent in the soramble.
England felt the need of increased power durin, these decade.

2 C. J. H. Bayes, A Generation of Materialism, New York, Harper &
Bros., 1941, 217.
-3

.!2.!!.,

220.

...

(1670-19OO t l), linoe she and Russia were at odda over their expansions in the
Near East. she and Oermany were rivals 1n naval production) and she and
France were traditional enemies, whos. animolity had inoreased over oolonlal
di,putea.

France, navln£ just lost land ae a result of the Franoo-Pruee1an

Vlar, wanted to eave taoe in the eye. of the world by aoquiring an extend.....
empire.

Ruesia, faoing an lnterruptiqn ot her Balk:an oampaign, turned not to

Atrica, as did the other powers, but to Asb..

The al.tuatiOL of Oarmany and

Italy d1. ttered from that of the other Great Powerl 1n that they were not

relumln"

but starting tho ta.k of building empires.

Both entered the

oolonial field late, because of a delayed unifioation of their own oountrie ••
While the other. were vieing tor oolonie. many years before, o.rmany and
Italy were struggling to unit. their many prOVinces into strone nationalistio

statel, and had just sucoeeded 1n

80

d01n, prior to this period.

Then began a series of diplomatio allianoe. amonr these countries
to in.ure BUooe.stul oolonial aotivity.

The first of the •• arNe.nts oame in

1879, when G....ny and Austria-Hungary, signed 'What became the Dual Alliance.

This alliance

'WaS

of ahort duration, however, for in 1852

Germany and Austria to form the Triple Alliance.

ltal~,.. ~oined

with

Realisinr, that without the

aupport of aome stronger nation, it would be impoaslble to aoquire new

possessions, Italy aooepted the opportunity to join forces with the a1gnatorie.

of the Dual Alliance.

Thus began an alUanae which _s to exist until 1915.

Yost of the agreements made durin, this period olaimed to be defensive in
charaoter.

The two following artioles from the Triple Allianoe bear this oute

Artiole S.
Should one ot the aignatory I_rt1e8 be drawn into war with

III

powr not

5

belonging to the alllanoe. the two others are pledged to obserYe a
benevolent neutrality toward the aignatory power.
Artiole ,.
Should one ot the signatory parties be attacked without provocation,
tor whatever cause, by a power not belonginf: to the alliance. the
two other parties are bound to furnish help and asaistanoe with all
their strength to the party attacked.'
In the years immediately tollowinr this treaty Italy showed
~onsiderable

interest in Tripoli and CyrenaicaJ and Germany. not wishing to

10 •• the support ot Italy, or more probably, not wishing to aee Italy join
iii th France or England, renewed the Triple Alliance in 1881.

This renewal

oontained a secret clause, proteoting Italy against any attempt by France to
take over Italy's territory in Atrica. 5 Despite thi. agreement Italy prooeeded
~o make a treaty with France in 1900, ooncerning African expansion. 6
~.rmany

Wheth.r

was aware ot this treaty is unoertain, but in 1902 the Triple

~llianoe

ft.

again renewed, and it reassured Italy ot German support in

rripolitanla and Cyrenaioa, and also contained a deolaration trom Austriathat no opposition would be ottered to Italian measurea in thea.
provinoes. 7

~~ary

'.l'hua the Triple Alliance. contraoted in 1882 and renewed twioe betore
902, aligned Germany, Austria-Hungary and a doubtful Italy. each one
~romt8in,

to support the others in their colonial polioy.

, A. F. Pribram. The Secret Treaties ot Austria-Hunga
y J. G. DtAroy Paul and D. P.)(eyers, 'Ci"mbr1dge-;-IiO'ftrd Press.
5

.!!!!.,

212.

6 Explained on page 7.
1

Pribram. II. 213.

, Translated
lb21, II, 211.

6

Suffering from her recent defeat in the Franoo-Pru88ian War, France
luooeeded in adding Tunis and Algeria to her empire, although Italy had
entertained the idea ot doing the aame.

HoweTer, when France began plan. tor

annexing Morooco, she wisely deoided to obtain the oonsent
interested powers.

of the other

It _s at thia time that the Italian-Frenoh Treaty

materialized.
To understand the Italian ohange ot policy it is neoessary at this
time to review the French relations with Russia and England.

Germany teared

the possible alliance of France and Russia, which would leave her with an
enemy to the west and an enemy to the east.

SUCh an alliance did not appear

too probable, due to the seemingly insurmountable d1 tferenee in
between republican France and monarchial Russia.

~O'Vernment

However, to avoid any such

danger, Bismarok joined the League ot Three Emperors in 1881.' This league
oompe.ed ot Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, was strengthened by a
Reinsurance Treaty shortly afterward, despite the taot that the Triple Allianoe
bad already been tormed.

In 1890 William II refused to renew this Treaty and

as Bismarck had feared France and Russia were drawn closer together. a
On

August 27, 1891, Russia and France signed an agreement, pledging

to consult one another over any threat to peace. 9 This statement was too
indefinite to suit the French plans,
II&S

80

in 1893 the follOWing secret treaty

arranged:

~uropean

a A. F. Pribram, England and the International Policy
Great Powers, OXford, Olaredon ~88, 1931, 94.
9 Pribram, Secret Treaties, II, 213.

2!. ~

7

If Franoe 1.. attaoked by Germany or by Italy .upported by Germany,
Russia ahall employ all her available foroe. to attaok Germany.
If Rusda 1s attaoked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, Franoe
.hall employ all her aTailable foroes to fight Germany.10
This Dual Allianoe between Russia and Pranoe was the first step then toward
the Triple Eatente, formed as a balanoe 01' power against the Triple Allianoe.

.

It an allianoe between England and France was inconceiTable before

the Dual Alliance, it was eTen more remote now that Russia had joined with
Franoe, her tradl tional enemy.

Russia and England had also been haTing

diffioulty in the Near East, but the diplomatic problem was further complioatee
by the faot that England did not wish to weaken Russia too much, beoauae then

Germany WDuld be giTen a tree hand.
Con.equently England, isolated by her trouble. with rrance, Germany,
and Russia, was desperately trying to align heraelf with some other power,
aa not to be left alone again.t them all.

SO

One of these disputes between

England and France deTeloped over the Fashocla affair.

Finally, in 1899 an

Anglo-Frenoh Agreement settled the trouble in Fashoda, and both countries
marked out their spheres of interest in the Sudan.
It is now possible to return to the treaty made between Italy and
Franoe, aince it oame about direotly a. a result of the Anglo-Frenoh agreement,
Italy, learning of this agreement, asked France if this would interfere with
the Turkieh provinoe. of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, whioh the Italians wanted for
themselve..

10

In order to gain the tood w111 01' Italy, Pranoe told the Italian

.!!?!!.,

215.

8

foreign ministe; that they had no designs on Tripoli or Cyrenaica. ll
How, although Italy was a member ot the Triple Alliance, a further
arrangement was made on December 16, 1900, when Italy promised not to oppose
France in
the exeroise and the safeguarding ot the rights which are the result for
her of the proximity of her territory (Algeria) with that (Moroocan)
Empire ••• it being understood that. it a moditication at the political
or territorial status of Morocco should result theretrom, Italy could
re.erve to herself, as a measure of reciprocity, the right event~l1Y to
develop her intluence with regard tc Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 2
This _s ot great importance to

France, because until now Italy

had been prepared to tight rather than let France take any more of North
Africa.
Baving obtained the oonsent ot Italy to go ahead in Moroceo, FraDOe
_. nolt' prepared to deal wi. th England and Spain.
M. Deleas •• , the French foreign minister, next appro_ched Spain, and

promised her the northern coast ot Morooco, including Tangier and Fe., and a
part ot the South, if France could take the reat. 1S The Spanish Cabinet
ref'used to sign the agreement, because they feared the reaction of' England.
To approach the Bnglish was a very difficult thing to do, even thougl
a sucoesstul agreement had been made in 1899 ccncerning the 'aahoda affair.
\

Deleasse, however, selected a very opportune time to consult with England,

11 W. H. Cooke and E. P. Stickney (ed.), Readings in Euro~an
International Relations Since ~, New York, Harper & Bros.,-r931,-62.
12 Pribram, Secret Treaties, II, 246.
13 0:. P. Gooch, Hiatory
Co., 1922, 341.

2! Modern

Europe, New York, Henry Holt &

9

beoause Englanc!'waa having trouble with Germany over the following points:
1) German preas reportl against Britain'lII oonduot in South Atrioa were very
unfavorable J 2) German naval power was inoreasing steadily, and 3) Germal17' III
Bagdad Railway Soheme was not in keeping with the Briti.h plans in the Near
East.
England, therefore, did not peaitate to acoept the French otfer ot
an a11ianoe at this time, and the Entente Cordiale

'ft.

signed in 1904.

A tew

yearl later, the Triple Entente wal tormed, oomposed ot Russia, France, and
England, but first the Anglo-Russian ditfioulties had to be smoothed out.
The

deolaration of April 8, 1904, al it was made known to the

general publio, contained the following agreements I
1. The Government of the French Republio undertakes not to obstruct the
aotion ot Great Britain in Egypt.
2. The Government of the Frenoh Republio deolares that they have no
intention of altering the politioal statue of Moroooo.
3. Ril Britannio Majesty's Government reoogni,e. that it appertain. to
Franae • • • to bring about the administrative, eoonomioal, finanoial and
military retorm of which it atands in need an Moroooci1.
4. In order to seoure the tree passage ot the Straits of Gibraltar, the
two Government. agree not to permit the ereotion of any fortifioations.
5. In regard to these interests the Frenoh Government will oome to aD
understanding with the Spanish Government. 14
However, that waa not the complete arrangement made between these
two powers, beoause in 1911 the tollowing aeoret artiole. beoame known,
1. Whenever the Sultan oease. to exeroise authority over it (Uoroooo),
the northern part should oome wi thin the sphere of influenoe of Spain,
and the remaining part be lett to France.

14 G. P. Goooh and Harold Temperly (ed.), British Documents on the

Ori~in of the War (1898-1914), London, Hi. Majesty's Atationery Ottice,l9!7,'

III ,S136-=!'9l. -

10

..
It Spain.

2.
• • .hould think proper to deoline the arrangement between
Franoe and Great Britain would be none the less applioable. 1S
Naturally, Spain signed the agreement, and France was now tree to proceed with
her plans in MOroooo.
\

On Deoember 10, 1904 Delcasse addressed the Frenoh Chamber ot

Deputies with theae words,
The time has oome to oonvince MOrooco that tor the sake of tranquility,
we should aid it in establishing internal seourity and order, for our
prosperity we should furnish capital to profit ~ the relouroes in whioh
Morooco abounds, so that continuing to liTe itl own 11te, it. ouatoma,
lawl and chieta being Bafer,uarded, under a Sultan whose authority will be
strengthened and extended, Morocoo will know our power only through the
benefit • .nioh will aooompany it.1S
France was makillg use ot the artiole in the Anglo-French Treaty whic
had given them the right to protect their own territories against attaoks by
the Moroooans.

Since Moroooo bordered direotly on Algeria, there were oertain

to be raids aoross the border.

International attention was too used on the

Moroocan disorder at this time. when Ion Ferdicaris. a naturalized Amerioan
oitizen~

1I&S

kidnapped by a Morocoan bandit, Raisuli.

The Amerioan Secretary

ct State, John Bay, dispatohed .. naval squadron to Morooco and issued a demand
tor "Perd1caris alive or Rai.uli dead."17

Perdicaril was loon released,

although some oredit a Frenoh diplomat tor seouring h'is re1ease. lS Thil, ot

15

el).,

~.,

394.

16 P. T. Moon, Imperialism
1927, 199.

~

World Politios, New York, Maomi1lan

17 W. F. Johnson, Amerioa'. Foreign Relationa, New York, Century
1916, II, 150.

18 Moon, 201.

Co.~

11

oour.e, . brought a favorable light to the Frenoh plan at bringing order into
Morocoo.
Extensive Frenoh loans made to the Sultan at Morocco also added to
the

i~~nch

011.1. that they were entitled to enter Morocco

at this time.

In

1900 Adb ... l-hh, just sixteen, oame to the throne and was encouraged to spend
his money freely on various European luxuries.

Unable to collect higher taxes

from his people, he aocepted a Frenoh loan of sixty-two million francs at a
five per cent interest on the security of sixty per cent of his customs

reven~

•

After makin" suoh a generous loan, France al8't.l1Md the privilege ot straighteni

~

out the interaal ohaos ot the Morocoan state.

Shortly after the loan . , made

M. Saint-Rene Talliandler was sent to Fez ~ Delca'8~ to inst1tute a program

ot reforms.

These retorm. inoluded the organization ot the militar,y polioe

under Frenoh officers, the establishment of a state bank to

brin~

about

tinancial order, and the undertakinr, ot various public 'WOrks with Frenoh
capital. 19
No 'Word ot d18approval was forthooming tram England, Spain, or Italy
linoe they had been silenoed by earlier treaties promising them compensations.
Russia also remained quiet beaause of the Dual Alliance made in 1893.

Only

Germany objeoted, sinoe she had not been assured ot oolonial galns it France

Germ&nJ's objeotion took the tbrm ot a visit by the Kaiser to
Tangier, after an unsuccessful appeal to President Roosevelt to call tor a

19

~.,

202.

conferenoe. Wh1le in Tangier, the Kaiser delivered a foroeful speeoh in
lIhioh he deolared that "the Sultan __ lovereign and independent and ahould
be

oautious about adoptln~ the Frenoh program of reforms."20

Be further

olaimed that "Moroooo should remain open to the oommeroe of all nations on
equal terms. 2l

The Sultan was greatly impressed by the speeoh and refused

to sign the plans, unleas they were

f~rst

discuased by an international oonfer

enoe.
\

Meanwhile, Delcalae met with the Frenoh Cabinet in June and demanded
that France uphold it. honor, even it _r wa. neceseary.

He added that

England had promised to suppo'rt the French. 22 The French Cabinet ._
doubtful ot English support, and felt they could count only on Rusaia as a
sure ally.

Russia at thil time, however. _a suffering from the

War, so she, too, was of little help.

RU8so-Japanes~

Atter some discussion, the Cabinet

,

Toted 1n l,'aTor of a oonferenoe and De10asse resigned to be Buooeeded by
M. Rouvier.
Thus we have the .etting tor the famous Algeoiras Oonterenoe held
from Januar" 16 to April 7, 1906.

The United States helped sponsor this

oonterence beoauae ot,her .'r11er participation in the Madrid Oonterence ot
1860, which had agreed to the ·open door" of Morocco.

It waa on this point

that Germany felt the right to demand another conterenoe, since ahe too had
been a signatory.

20

P. W. Sl08son, Europe Since

1936, 263-4.
21

~.,

22

Moon

264.

204.

~, Bos~on,

Houghton Mifflin 00.,

CHAPTER II
AMERICA! PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE
With the opening of the Alge.iras Conferenoe public opinion in the
United States was divided along three lines.

The tirlt and most controversial

topio oonoerned whether or not the United Statea had the right to take an
active part in tAe problem.

Both Republican and Democratic Senators voiced

their opinionl publicly, and

~.paper

and magazine editors quiokly lined up

tor or against our partioipation.
One ot the firat objections to President Roosevelt's whole-hearted
btcking of the conterenoe wal based on the argument that suoh an action would
be

oontrary

",,0

came trom the

our )(onroe Dootrine.

AI might be expeoted moat

ot the objeotioll ~

Democrats, who tollowed the leadership ot Senator Augustu8

Baoon of the Demoorats.

Senator Baoon pointed out in hia argument that.

Our oommeroial interests are not involved in the prooeedings ot the
oonference, sinoe they are safeguarded by the Madrid Conferenoe, and the
-Algectraa Conference disavows the intention of reViling them. l

If then our commercial intereatl were not involved, the United
State. would not be justified in entering the conterence, lince that was one

1 "U. S. and the Moroocan Conterence," Harper's Weekly, New York,
January 27, 1906, 112.

13

14
'"
of the main reasons
for our interest 1n it.

Senator Baoon then prooeeded to

explain that the real proble.s to bedisculsed were political, beoause,
Germany ftS asking tor permission to exeroiae the temporary oontrol ot
the orown domains, whioh were given a8 seourity for the loan of two
million dollars, made by German bankers to the Sultan 01' Morocoo. Thia
is poU tioal beoause so otten this temporary oontrol becomes permanent. • ..
Anot~s:' question to be handled involves the problem of whether or not the
maintenanae of order in the Sultanta dominion. should be entrusted to
'rance or to international interetts.'
The •• above mentioned problema, claimed Senator Baoon, oould only be
judged as politioal question8 and it would then be contrary to the Monroe
Dootrine for the United S+.ate8 to beoome involved in such an affair.

Be

further added that the only pos8ible excuse tor United States repres.ntation
would be aome inoident similar to the Perdicarie affairt and sinoe no suoh
eTent had ooourred we should not beoome involved, becau8e" "11> i8 the UD.'varyiD.f]
policy of our government to oross such bridges when we oome to them."
Suoh arguments coming trom a Democratio Senator might not have
oarried muoh wight, but much to the surprise of all, Senator Eugene Hale, the
leader 01' the Republioan _jority,

agreed with him.

Senator Hale stated that

he ..... s afraid the President would lead us into an entangling allianoe and
would set a precedent in our foreign policy."!
"that our

delegate~

would be reoalled in case a vote was demanded against one

country or the other."4

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4. Ibid.

He further claimed, however,

D

15

.
'rom. the Republiou group oame an lIaedie:t;e an....r througb it.
spokellll&l1, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.

A8

a m_ber of the Foreip Utair.

Committee, he attempted to refute the Demooratl' agrumen1l. that it the Uni1led

State. repre.el1tativ •• attendAMl thl. conteren.. it would be a 411regard of
the principle. 1&14 down by the MolU"Oe Dootrine.

He went still turther to

explain ....y any objeotiou which might arl.e oon_ming Washlngtion'. warning
against

W8Dtangling

allianoe•• -

In refuting the tirat argument· he old,
The Jlonroe Deetrlne 1. not be1ng v10lated, s1noe we are not ••eldng
terr1tory or entering into al11anoe. wMoh m1gbt lavol.,.. u. in war.
Franoe and Ge1WU1Y are both our tr1endl. 1'Ie are merely trying to avoid
war between th.... 8
fhen 11noe lome objeotion. had been voioed conoerning the

poldbil1ty 01' the United State. beooming involved in wan entangling all:1anoenth one or more European oountries, Senator LOdge went on to di.cuss thi ••
Would 1t be absolutely wise to adhere to Washington's warning wh10h _s
expre.sed :lmJaediately atter our di8&greement with Franoe oonoern1ng the
treaty of allianoe? J'urthe1"B)re, this warning doe. not in the least
«Eolude, and neYer hal been held to exolude, the United State. from
agre_ent. with one or more European power. u to matters at1'eet1ng trade
and oo. .roe, or trOll internat10nal oonvrtiOl'1s, whioh are entered into
from the pr01lOtlon ot the world'. peaoe.
A. is quite md811t trOll. the foregoing statement. one

41ft10u1t1•• was to determine whether or not the United &bate.

ot the

main

wa. pr1aarily

oonoerned over tiM. conterence because ot ittl oommercial or polltioal interest •

6 H. C. Lodge, "JIonroe Doctrine and lIorooco," !!!!"per' I Week1l,
1_ York, L, llaroh 10, 1906, 332.

-

e Ibid., 333.
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It oommercial intereats were endangered, many telt we would not be violating
the principles ot the Vonroe Dootrine, while on the other hand, it our main
concern was for the political aituation in Morocco, then we would be breaking
a principle tor which we had tought tor over seventy-tive years.
As an example ot the Amerioan attitude oonoerning this question,
Outlook Itated that "our interests are, commercial not political. ft7

This

ltatement was baaed on the Treaty ot Madrid made- in 1880 which provided tor
an "open-door" in Morooco tor all powers signing thia treaty, and which we now
law as being endangered due to the French-German contrcver.,y over Morocco.
Thil opinion was agreed to by most of the Republicans and was upheld al we
have seen by Senator Lodge.
However popular this argument waa in our country, the otfioial trade
figures of Morocoo in 1904 abow that total United States trade with Morooco
amounted to only .'00,000, compared with .2,500 ,000 for Germany, $4,000,000
for France and $8,600,000 tor England.

Thele tigurel alone would leem to

deny the tact that the United States would teel very aeriously the threat of
the p088ible 1088 at Morocco's trade. 8
To counteraot the Republican ltatement, the Democrats pointed to the
statement made by England which detinitely attempted to put the United Statel
on the spot al violating the Monroe Dootrine by her politioal intervention in
~roooo.

Sydney Brookl attacked Senator Lodge tor declaring the interest of

7 wU. S. and the Morocoan Conference," Outlook, LXXXII, January 27,
1906, 144-146.
8

"france and Her rore ign Re lat i ona ," Review

~rch, 1906, 270.

2!. Reviewl,

XXXI II ,
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the United States to be oOlllllleroial by saying that, "it [United States1

is

sitting at and voting at a conferenoe on a question that ia predominently,
if not exolusively, a European question."9 'fo substantiate his opinion that
the United State. waa inoonsistent in upholding the Monroe Dootrine, Brook.
referred to the prevailing aituationl in Venezuela and MOrocoo with thes.
wordll
Against Vene.uela France haa oomplaintl whioh the world i. at one in
regarding a. well founded. A, valuable ooncession granted to her
oiti&ena haa been frivoloualy oanoelled. Her mini.ter has been treated
'With studied and oontemptuoul indignity. But before exaoting reparatione
tor these and other injurie. Franoe mu.t aeek the aanotion of the United
States. She is informed that under no oiroumstanoes will .he be permittee
to oocupy permanently a single inch ot Venezuelan territory. Eyen a
temporary occupation exposes her at once to the animo.ity and 8uspicion
of Amerioan opinion. IO
After thus showing how the United Statea interpreted and applied the
Monroe Dootrine to mattera relating to the Western Hemisphere, he then stated
that "the oontrast between the liberty the United States enjoys in Morocoo
and

Europe and the restriotions she obUgea Europe to contorm to in South

Amerioa, makes lomething of an international anomoly."

Be further added "the

United State. bas neither a oommercial nor politioal interest in Morooco."ll
Several other important question. were brought forth by Brooks in
this article, whioh strongly oondemned the Amerioan position and strengthened
the Democratio argument to withdraw our repre.entative..

Be as.erted that.

9 Sydney Brooks, "U. S. at A,lgeoiral trom an Englilh Standpoint,·
Harper'. Weekll' L, )(aroh 24,1906,402.

10

~.,

11

Ibid.

403.
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Roose.elt bad raised the question ot better treatment tor the Jews
in Morocoo, whioh England teels would certainly not be disoussed
exoept tor Roo.e.elt's initiative.
2) Roose.. lt raised a question ot an international system ot policy
whioh England olaims is a oommitment ot Amerioa' 8 aiding with Germany.
3) Amerioa will probably not assume the slighteat responsibility tor
carrying out the reoommendations ot the oonterence and admits us
liable tor the results ot whate.er deoidon is reaohed. There{jre,
the oonterenoes oannot atteot her politically or oommercially.

1)

In dealing with the tirst ot. these statements it 11 necessary to
review the conditions existing among the Jews in Morocco.
Je~

For many years the

had been treated badly in Morocoo being torced to wear the gabardine and

to go baretoot in the streets.
two-story houses.

The law even restricted them trom living in

Bowe.er, little heed was paid to this situation until

international attention was tooused on it due to an inoident whioh oocurred in
the early twentieth oentury.

There are two versions to the inoident; the

first wa_ that ot the French government, whioh read, "A respectable Jew,
aged seventy, who wa. a French 01 then trOll'!. Algiers,

118..

attaoked by a mob

at Fez, drenohed with kerosene and burned alive."l!
Naturally the French newspapers played up the story dramatically,
uling it 1n the hope ot arousing the world's attention to the need ot some
organized toroe (namely Frenoh)

~ich

would bring law and order to Morooco.

!he Morocoan government immediately presented its side ot the story by stating

that "the Jew

was

not aged, respectable nor a French cithen.

Be was

justitiably shot tcr insulting a Moorl.h woman on the street."l'

12

Ibid.

13

"Bow we got into it,· Independent, LX, January 11, 1906, 118.
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Despite the refutation of the Frenoh story by the Morocoan government
the United States Consul at Tangier prote,ted and demanded punishment for
Itho.e guilty.

He further warned the Sultan:

It i8 undi8putably requisite that the Israelite. of Moroooo should be
proteoted by the looal authorities, otherwise, it will not be long
betore they will be proteoted by toreign nations.15
I'hi8 inoident, no doubt, was what Sidney Brooks was reterrint; to 1n hie
~rtiole,

when he olaimed that Roosevelt had raised the Jewish problem whioh

rould otherwise not have been raised it Roosevelt had not done so.
!he seoond aocusation made by Brooks, olaiming that the United States

py her suggestions ot an international system of policy made a commitment ot
Unerica, elding 111 th Germany, will be disoussed later in a more detailed
~nner,

although it did not seem to be strongly substantiated by the American

ublio.

When Brooks stated that Amerioa would probably not assume the
lightest responsibility for carrying out the reoommendations of the conterence
~d
~

admitted no liability tor the results ot whatever deoision was reaohed,
raised a question whioh had been voioed many times by the people of Amerioa.

he Un! ted States in entering this oonterence could in the eyes ot many be
laoing itselt in quite a ditfioult position, beoause it it came to a deoision,
b. United States might be toroed to side either wi th Germa.~ or France.

In

uoh a ea.e we would have loat a trielld sinoe we were presU'ID&bly entering the
e ollterence as a friend of both oountries.

Thi, question was brought to the attention ot the publio in an

-

15

-

Ibid.
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article attempting to explain away argument. made by Senator Bacon. 16 The
problem wal stated a8 tollows,

"Bow oan the United Stat•• assilt except by

voting tor one sid. or the other in whioh event they are sure to ottend a
nation with whioh the American government il on triendly term.?" The answer
given by this writer tollowed the opinion ot most ot the men olole to the
President, tor he said, "It our delegate. are oalled on to vote in a _y to
grieve el ther Franoe or Germany, the Seoretary ot State oan instruot them to
wi thdraw trom the conterence." .As we have 8een, Senator Bale agreed with
thil theory, although he had lided with Senator Bacon on the other issue ••
Senator Spooner a180 entered into this debate by stronrly objecting
to the stand taken by Senator Bacon.

In answering the Republican Senator,

he said that "the men (dele,atel) were not to vote, but merely lilten, and
discU.I, if they desired."l7

But his chiet ditterenoe with Senator Bacon

arose conoerning whether or not dilculsion should be oarried on in open or
closed le8sion.

Be wal in tavor of a cloled .ellion, while Senator Bacon

olaimed, "no torei,n government should be ottended, nor _s any Ili,ht intended
to the President. ,,18

However, the Senate voted not to have an open

discussion of the problem.

the following day Senator Bacon repeated a

request made previously "that the President present a report on whatever
instructionl were given to our delegatel sinoe the Pre.ident'. entire polioy

16

"U. S. and the Moroccan Conterenoe," Outlook, UXXII t January 27,
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both in Europe and South and Central America, has seriously alarmed Senator.
on both .1de •• - 19
An editorial on the .ame day reintoroed Senator Spooner's statement

that our representatives were to listen and discuss, but not vote, unl.s, they
tirst oontacted their home government.
the question then aroae as tp why the United Statel should becozr.e
involved in the oonterenoe at all, it they intended to
decision prove embarrassing to the United States.

~thdraw

should their

Several theories were

presented along thh line, most important ot which wa. that there seemed to be
a detinite threat ot war existing between Germany and France, it some solution
wal

not reached conoerning their interests in Morooco.

The United State8,

having showed their power a. arbitrator reoently in Venezuela and in the RussoJapanese War, _y ha.,.e telt the oall to otter their servioe. again.

.Aa

Senator Lodge law it, France and Germany were both our friends, we were merely
trying to avoid war between them.
Although the question was debatable whether a war mirht deTelop
beoause ot this trouble, Mr. Root claimed that "there are strained relations
between Franoe and Germany. and it is supposed that a oasus

bell~

-.y be

found there. ft20 This opinion was oontradictory to the optimistio statement
made by the

.!!! !.2!:! Times

a week earlier that neither London nol' the United

States expeoted war,21 despite the taot that their newspaper had said on the

19

.!!?!!.,
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20
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previous day, tnat J
Ambassador White and Minister Gummere have gone to the conference with
two objeots--the maintenanoe of the open-door in Morooco, and the
exeroise ot good offioes by this oountry in the oonferenoe to smooth
away asperities and prevent the development of friotion that jeopardizes
world peaoe. 22
Sinoe it 18 impossible to know whether war would have resulted had
the United States tailed to join the opnferenoe, we oan merely oonclude that
there ..... a di tferenoe ot opinion on the subjeot.

That many ot the Amerioan

people telt oonfident in the judgment of President Roosevelt i. evident from
the to 11 owing ata tement:
Wi th Senator Spooner, mo at Amerioana, 118 think, believe that the Predden'
ot the United Statee, who hit upon the p.yohologloal moment to intervene
and bring to an end the deplorable war between Rueda and Japan, oan be
trusted to determine the payohologloal moment when our ambassadors must
withdraw trom the Morooean Conterenoe in order to eave this oountry from
all danger ot gntortunate European entanglements, should suoh a moment
oome to pass. 2
Amother view on the importanoe of the United States' partioipation
was pre.ented in the same artiole, when the author oontinued, "Furthermore,
though it 11 not generally known, two ot the Great Powers deolined to be
represented unless all the signatories to the
part. "

existin~

Moroocan Treaty took

It suoh _s the oase, the oonterenoe might not have been held without

the pr.senoe ot the United States- representatives.
It is quite evident that aa a result ot the seoret treaties
negotiated by the European oountries during the years preoeding the

1906, 244.

oonterenoe~

22

~.,

January 6, 1906.
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nU. S. and the Moroooan Conterenoe," Outlook, LXXXII, February 3
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all the Bir; Powers had lined up, even betore the oonference oonvened, elther
tor France or Germany.

a.

!he Un! ted State. could then perform a valuable

senioe to Bueh a meeting by arriving a. an apartial member.
of oourse,

On

This position,

olaimed by the United States on .e"f'era1 oooaslons.

Janua17 4, 1906 the

!!! ~ Tl.s

8&ld,

Mes8r •• WhIte and Gummere, the _rloan deleptes w111 go into the
oonterenoe ab.olutely unoOlllll1tted to elther the FreDOb or the Gem&Jl
contentions. The gG"f'ermaent'. vle.. 18 that Amerioa bas by "f'irtue of her
anoient inter.st in Moroooo, nfpts even superior to tho.e ot any
European Itate in deoiding tbe or1tioal que.tion. whioh will oome betore
the oonterence • • • Amerioa stands unoommitted elther to tbe German
propoSitlon, the oreation of an international poltlt toroe, or the Frenoh
plan of employing Algerian polioe for the purpose.

---..---

Three daY8 later the ed1tor of the New York Times ap.in l"epeated the.

the United States would remain impartial.

Th. anoient rights ot Amerioa referred to in the pre"f'ious artiole
were explained by the author in thIs .y.

ot thiB "f'1. . 11 that Amerioa, ainglebanded, made _r upon the
Barbary Stat.s, wiped out piracy in the Medlterranean -tera, and
oonoluded the tirst treaty between &nJ oivi11zed Dation and tho •• States,
a treaty mioh au tormed the bash of the demand ot 8"f'ery other nation
tor favored natlon treatment at the hand. of Morooco • • • The UD1ted
Statee teel. it has the rIght and duty to partioipate in this oODferenoe.= 5
1'he bad.

'.1'he United

state. - . then olabling righte to partioipate 1n the

Algeolraa Conterenoe, beoause one hundred and nineteen years ago they had mad e
their tirat treaty ~th Moroooo.

They tollowed this treaty with another

in 1863, and then in 1886, Amerioa with eleven other coUlltri •• had _t at

24
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Jfadrid, where a third treaty was signed.

This latter treaty had remained as·

the standrad for dealing with Morocco, until the recent olash between French
and German interests.
Not all Americans felt, however, that this was a sound reason for
the United States to intervene in the affairs of Morocco.

One opponent

stated:
The fantastic explanation from washington, that our historic bombardment
of the Barbary pirates entitle. WI to a plaoe in the conferenoe, can
hardly be reoeived with gravity by Buro~an diplomat., however, good
their oontrol of their faoial mU801ea. 2
Taking into aocount then the many reasons advanoed by the United
States for their active partioipation in the matter, it oan be assumed that
reoognition might have been given to her ancient rights in Morocco and to her
oommeroial interests.

Furthermore, some oonsideration might be forthooming

beoause of Roosevelt's successtul role as arbitrator in several incidents just
prior to this orisis in Morocco,

but undoubtedly, the strongest olaim held by

the United States was the urgent request by' Germany and the seeming desire of
It

France to have the United States help them settle their problems without
reoourse to war.

This last reason will be emphasized in a later ohapter,

dealing with the offioial oorrespondenoe between the irench and German
.inisters and President Roo.evelt.
A. to the Amerioan assertion that they were attending the oonference
unoommitted to either the Frenoh or German interests, and were viewing the

26
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situation trom a oompletely impartial position--that is open to oriticism.
Certainly, our ottioial papera, whioh were not made pubUo at the tll1Wt, but
whioh later presented ua with the true pioture at Amerioan intereats, leaves a
question in our minds as to just how impartial the United States wal.
With

80

many argument8 being debated during the months preoeding the

Conterenoe, it might be expeoted that Amerioan interest might lag. however,
with the departure ot the Amerioan delegates to Algeoira8 the intere8t of the
Amerioan publio was re-awakened to the approaohing Conterenoe.

Spain, who

was to aot as hoat to the representatives ot the partioipating oountries also
reoognized the importanoe at the Conterenoe and the following deaoription
reaohed the Amerioan newspapers from Algeoiras.
This quaint old town ie gradually awakening aa the day tor the opening ot
the Conterenoe on Moroooan reform approaohea, and the usual Spanish
lethargy haa given plaoe to a burst ot animation and excitement. All
publio buildings and bridges are resplendent with orim80n deoorations and
tape.trles~ ~ • the gathering ot many warship. add. a touoh ot
piotureaquen.s, and aignitioanoe to the 8oene. 27
Although there __ a

~eneral

opttmistio feeling that a satisfaotory

arrangement oould be made oonoerning the problem in Moroooo, Senator Hale, who
had earlier expreased hh disapproval ot sending Amerioan delegates to the
Conterenoe, again emphasized this by saying'
The dan~er i8 not trom the President or the Seoretary ot State, but trom.
the asoendanoe and promise of the war'spirit in the oountry • • • It waul.
be much better it we oould keep our hands otf. But we shall get out ot
this without being enta.ngled. 28

27
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It was a distinguished group of delegates who assembled on January
16, 1906 to open the Conferenoe.

The senior delegates from the various

oountri•• were; M. R.voil of Franoe, who waa the ex-gavernor of AlgiersJ
Herr von Radowitz of Germany; Henry White of the United States, Marquia
Visoonti Venosta of Italy. Count Caasini of RUlsia, Who was the Ambassador to
Spain; Sir Arthur lioolson, who -.. the Ambassador to Russia; Mohammed el
Torres of Moroooo) and the Duke of Almodovar of Spain, who was ohosen

Preslden~

of the Conferenee. 29
An intere.ting episode ooourred just prior to the opening of the

Conferenoe, whioh involved Mohammed 81 Torres.
doubt

_s

The MOroooan delegate no

annoyed by the repeated statements olaiming that i'oreign help _8

needed to put down disorder in Morocoo, and so he responded to one such
remark, "Why don't they hold a Conference upon Russia and establish order
there'"SO
As the minor questions were settled first by the delegates, the
Amerioans began to show leas interest in the Conferenoe, but when the importan1
questions of oontrol of the bank and polioe were brought before the delegates
the publio again eagerly followed the news from Algeoira ••
One interesting item of news came to the attention of the Amerioan

public, shortly after the arrival of the delegates from the United States.
While both Henry White and Samuel Gummere told of the great wealth in Moroooo,
Mr. Gumm.ere went on the explain, "Inve.tors there /J.oroooiJ think: they are

29
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losing money If"theY' do not make from 30 to 40 per oent, while 80 to 100 per
oent ia not rare.- 31
Aa the que8tionlS ot greater importanoe arolSe during the Conferenoe
the United States beoame

a~re

ot its powerful position at the Conterenoe.

Before analyzing the offioial communioations whioh made this Conferenoe
pos~1ble,

we will oonsider aome of the,public opinions, expressed in America,

during the Conterence, oonoerning the major problems to be disoussed.

!51
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CHAPTER III
AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH
AND GERMAN CLAIMS TO MOROCCO

As was stated in the preoed:1.ng ohapter, the United States
repeatedly claimed l that they were impartial in their attitude toward the
trouble in Vorocoo, but telt that sinoe they did not intend to gain materially
trom the oonterenoe, they could render a valuable service by their presenoe.
However, Allan Nevins probably worded it more correctly When he sald, RThe
United States ia not wholly impartial, but oertainly disinterested and
unseltish.- l
France was basing her olaim to inter terence in Moroooo on her
predominant interest in northern Atrioa.

1'hia interest was developed by the

taot that Franoe controlled Algeria, which adjoined Moroooo.
1&

Sinoe there -s

danger ot ,raids over the border of these two oountries, France felt the need

ot lome strong power Whioh ~uld bring order into this region.

Because France

~s geographioally closer than any other interested country, she was sugresting

~olice contrcl by the Frenoh.

Spain, who possibly might allo claim a speoial

~nterest in Moroooo, beoause she taces Morooco across the Mediterranean Sea

~ew

1 Allan Nevins, ~White: Thir~ Years
York, Harper Bros., 193~.
28
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. on the North, had agreed with Franoe in a seoret treaty to allow Franoe to
penetrate into mOlt of Morooco, reoeiving only a small seotion for herself.
Typioal of the United States' attitude toward this olaim of Morocco
was ibis statemente
the fact that there is a long 'boundary line between Algeria, a Frenoh
poelessi on, and Morocoo, naturally gives to France under any oircumltanoe.
a Ipecial interelt in whatever takes place acroa. the trontier. 2

Another article confirmed this by laying, "Beyond all q1.8ltion
France has;predominant intereats in Morocco, due to her adjoining Algerial
pOIsea8ion~"

3

Oe~ny

refused to aooept this clatm by Franoe, logioally etatings

Ju.tbeoauae one nation hal predominant interests do.s not follow that
ahe has predominant right. of interterenoe ••• It predominant intereat.
allow for predominant rights of interferenoe, why shouldn't Germany take
the Wetherlandl?
It would not be suffioient reason for France to

take over Morocoo

just becaule it bordered on Algeria, but the grave danger oame trom
Moroooan rebels aoros. the border.

att~cks

bf

Aa the Sultan'l money began to decline,

rebellion soon broke out in Morocco and quiokly apread to the border.

Franoe

took advantage of the trouble to point out that the Sultan was unable to keep
order in his country, and that some other nation, namely Franoe, should
undertake control of the polioe.

2 ")(orocco Conterenoe at Algeofras, tt Outlook, LXXXII I January 20,
1906, 30.
3 "Trouble at Algeciras," Independent, LX, March 8, 1906, 581.
4
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At least one

Ame~ioan

writer objeoted strongly to suoh a plan aa

suggested by Franoe. Arthur Sohneider, who had spent some time in Moroooo,
desoribed this situation.

Most of the big European oountries had obtained

speoial privileges for themselves by enoouraging young Mula Abd-el-Aziz to buy
their manutaotured goods.

When his money began to dwindle, they would loan him

Imoney and in this way inorease' their privileges.

However, word soon reaohed

the natives that the Sultan was overly extravagant and uprisings ooourred.
Most generous with its loans waa France,

wh~

tar exceeded the other countries

in thetr investments, and obviously in its privileges.

Mr. Schneider unfolded

imore of the story when he stated, "the rebellion began, and could have been
put down easily, it it had not been foatered by the French, who immediately

~egotiated another loan with the Sultan. ltS
That France was taking

advantag~

ot the rebellion to inorease her

special position in Morocco, and to draw attention to the disorder in the
~ountry

is quite obvious trom another observation made by Mr. Schneider.

"While this rebellion was going on the European papers made a terrifio new. ot
~t.n

Nevertheless, the author, who was at the soene of the disorder, said,

~Actually I, as an eyewitness, law nothing but slight skirmishea."e

Even giving France the benefit of the doubt, that great disorder did
itx1st in Morocoo, and that danger was probable to Algeria, Germany still telt
~hat

~90e,

it was not the task ot Franoe to undertake polioe control.

S "Truth About Morooco, " Harper's
187.
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31
of the Germans it was up to all the countries to control a troublesome nation,

Amerioa did not agree with the solution of Germany, nor did they
wholeheartedly accept the French plan, although they definitely considered
the French proposal more acoeptable than the German.

An article published by

Mr. Talliohet, the Editor-in-Chie! of the Swiss Review and a recognized authorit.y
in Europe, was highly oommended by Amerioan reviews as oontaining a possible

Mr. Talliohet wrotel

solution.

If any oountry is to intervene in order to put down rebellion in Moroooo,
it should be only one oountry, the one hearest and most interested in the
maintenance of order, sinoe saorifioes will be neoessary for the purpose.
France is clearly the power that fulfills'all the conditions. Germany
is too fars does not have proper equipment to carry out the job, and
would be placed in too olose a oontact with Algeria.'
Although these oomments seemed to assure the Frenoh of getting

oontrc~

of the polioe foroe, sinoe they fulfilled the neoessary requirements, the
United States and several other big powers withheld their approval.

The

,trongeat objeotion to .uoh a plan was based on the suspioion that perhap.
Frenoh oontrol of Morooco would not necessarily mean better oonditions for
the inhabitant..

Thi. question, raised by a few far-sighted individuals in

the United States. was allO mentioned by Mr. Tallichet.

Deapite the faot that

he favored having the French in oontrol of the polioe, rather than a foroe of
all the interested nations, he laid of France.
Her tormer treatment of other oolonte. has been unoomplimentary exoept in
Algeria and Tunis, where many ~provement8 have been made. But outside

1906, 726.

,

E. Tallichet,

~oroooo

Situation," Independent, LX, Maroh 29,
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of Algeria and Tun!s, her exploitation of the natives, 1s admitted even

by France, herself. 8

This latter reference no doubt concerns her colonial policy in
Indo-China, French Congo and Madagascar.

It could be expeoted then that

objection to the French proposal would be forthooming from Germany, but such
~.

not the case.

~sed

Mr. Tallichet explains that the other countries have not

this argument, because they, including Germany, have been doing the same

~hing.

Of oourse not everybody felt that the French treatment of her
polonies was unfavorable, for another writer stated, "In her oolonies, France
8

to be conrratulated upon her great work for civilization." 9
But whether the United States was rejecting the French plan for the

~bove

reason, or for some other reason, it oan be assumed that the former

Wrench attitude to her oolonies was not an argument in their favor at this

In addition to requesting control of the polioe foroe in Morooco,
Franoe was also maintaining that it would be her right to assume oontrol of the
~nk of Moroooo, 81noe she had invested more money than any other oountry in

.orocoo to keep the Sultan from beooming bankrupt.
~hat French trade with Morooco was

Furthermore, they claimed

~reater than that of any other nation.

Germany objected to this Frenoh trade with Morocoo strongly, stating
hat although their oommercial interests at this time were not oomparable to

8

~ •• 728.

9 "France and Her Foreign Relations," Review!!! Reviews, XXXIII, 270
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~hose of France,~ they were nevertheless growing.

It was Germany' 8 8uggestion,

then, that an international control be established in Morocco, whioh would
assure all the interested powers of a fair treatment.

Again Mr. Tallichet in

hi. artiole of March, 1906, commented on the situation by saying, "No country
has less interest in Morocco than Germany.
little importance, although Germany ia

Its oommeroial interests are of

~iming

at increasing them."

10

Germany _8 not claiming that she had the greatest oommercial
interest in Morooco as wal FranceJ but Ihe wal claiming the right to increase
her trade, if possible, and this she believed could be done only if the Bank
of Morocoo was controlled by an international torce.

It 1& only natural that

Germany's dealings with Moroooo would be muoh 1esa than those of France, ainoe
~rmany

had not entered the imperialistic field until much later than France

and Great Britain, because the unifioation of her country was not completed
until late

~n

the nineteenth century.

Aa to the French claim that their commerioal interests exceeded
those of any other country, we oan only reter again to the otficial trade
firures ot 1904, whioh show that England's trade with Morooco more than
doubled that of Franoe. ll
e8t~atel

However, France may have been includin, in her

her heavy loans to the Sultan.
When the Germani approached President Roosevelt with the suggestion

ot calling a oonterenoe to settle the problem ot Moroooo, they presented their
trump oard in basing their right to such a oonterence on a previous agreement

10

270.

Talliohet, "Morooco Situation," Independent, LX, 816.

.-- 11 ....."Fr~oe and Her Foreign Relations, 11 Review of Reviews, XXXIII,
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reaohed at the Madrid Convention 1n 1880.

Throu,hout the trying month. preoed! g

the conferenoe and 1n the early days ot the conterence, Germany instated over
and over, that her only interest in oalling thl1 _Elting
agreement. made at Madrid over twent,y year. ago.

11&. to uphold the

Aooordinr, to the Germana

the international prinoiplea involved were tar more important than the
reoop! tlon of any oountry"

predomll'1&I).t intereata.

Germany pointed out that one ot tha ob.uees of the ).{adrld Convention

guaranteed to eaoh ot the signatorie. the treatment ot the Mmoat-tavored nation •
In explaining the Emperor's aims, Baron von Sternburg, the aerman miniater to

the Un! ted Statea nid.
Germany" poltoy baa been and 18 to preeerve the atatua quo. fhia mark.
the difterent linel which Franoe and Germa~ are 10110win, at Algeoiral,
tbe one tending to guard the signatory powel"l ot the Treaty ot Kadrld and
the open door 111 trade, the other to turn Yoroooo into a Frenob
protectorate • • • franoe ola1ml a preterential pOlition beoauae of the
length ot her Allenan trontier and beoause ot her preponderant 1n'terelt
in Morocco' I previoue loanl' but Germany 01alm8 that peace should not be
bou~ht at the saoritice ot an internatl.onal prinoiple. • • Therefore,
OermaQy ia merely working to plaoe jhe two vital que.tiona--polioe and
bank--under international oontrol. 1
In inalat1ng that France was attempting to eatabllah a Frenoh
proteotorate in Moroooo, Germany • • directly attaoklDt the Anglo-Frenoh
iAgreement ot 1904, in which Great Britain recognhed that France amuleS pre.e"
order and provide 1\.a1.atanoe tor the purpo.e of all admil11atrat1ve, eoonomic,
finanoial, and military retonns in Moroooo.

Aa tar al Great Britain • •

oonoerned, Franoe . s to have a free hand in Horoooo and in return, France • •

12
1906, 585.

"Baron von Sternburg on Morocco," Outlook, LIXXII, March 11.
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11'111111& to let Great Britain have a tree hand in Eyypt.

The opinion of the United State. relative to th1a I1tuation _s not
too widely publioi,ed, although Hlu"R,Or t • W.eklz did voice it. opinion on the
Anglo-Frenoh treaty in thea. words.

"The Antlo-French Agreement it

lnoonsiatent with this treaty ~drl~ , ~oauae it would undoubtedly lead to
a French proteotorate. ,,13

Evidently, then, other. bee1de. Germany were

reoognbint the pos.ible danger.

Although not too much publicity • • given to

the United State.- attitude, behind the aoen•• at the oonterenoe their
delegate. were working to uphold the international prinoiple. ot the Madrid
Treaty.

In the word. of BarOll von Sternbur,:

The Conferenoe a. a whole reoop;nised, thia .ek, the special intereet.
ct France, but by ind.tin,; on the open door prevent. her from repeating
the oommeroial polioy ahe pursued in Tunia and Madagasoar. 14
France pre.ented another argument whioh she telt would seoure any
attempt she might make to gain oontrol of Moroooo.

Thi. ne. statement said

that the Uoroooan government and the nativeS liked the Frenoh and would not
cppo.e an intervention by them.

Germany did not heaita'te to deny the .tatement ~

and -..nt turther to deolar. that the Vorocoana would preteI' German interventlotl ~
The Amerioan pre •• a"reed with Germany by saying.
The Moor. at pre.ent d18l1l,e the French mo.t, sinoe the French by the
Anglo-French agreement are tr.e to oarry out their plan ot pacifio
penetration. Thi, polioy oan be oarried out only with the oon.ent of the

13 "Gravity or the Moroooo Inoident,· Baretr-. Weekllt New York.
XLII, July 8, 1905, 969.
14

"Baron von Sternburg on Moroooo," Outlook, LXXXII, 586.

..,
Moors, and ttt.y are determined to do e..... ryth1D@: in their pO_I" to re.18t
it. 15

This belief il further lubstantiated in another artiole Whioh
reters to the famous Tangier 1noident to prove the 8.r",*8nt that the German.
and not the French are oons1dered to be the friend8 of the Moors.

fhi.

artiole explains:
Another impression whioh .eems to prevail in Amerloa, and is oonstantly
.xploited 1n the newapepers, 1s that the Moors take kindly to the Frenoh.
lloth1ne oould be farther from the truth. In taot they taTor the Germans.
When pushed to ttt. _11 by FrallOo, he [the Sultan] lmplored help ot
Germany.
The Kai.er then paid hi. vl.1t at Tangler. The Tls1t oreated the most
lnwn•• exoltement I have 'ever wltnes.ed in Moroooo. Wall, and
buildings were I18wly white.shed, triumphal arohe. _re bunt and the
KiheI" adftnoed in great pomp and oeremony to the deep _11 ot the Royal
Moorhh band. 1S

Thie eyewitne.. aooount 'WOuld .e. . to deny any atatement. made by
the Frenoh that the Oermana were not liked by the Moroooans, but France
oontinued in 1ts propaganda, hopine that the re.t of the 'WOrld would agr.e
with her.
Referring onoe again to the statement made that "The United State.
18 not wholly impartial, but oertainly dla1ntereated and un.elfish, It it has
been proven that we did not .how partiality to either the French or German
argument. on all pointe.

Publio opinion varied toward the two interested

powers aa eaoh 01a1m . a pre.ented.

'l'.'he Amerioan. were alm08t Ul'Ulnimou8 in

15 Phillip Fran01a Bayard, "Condltion. at Government in Moroooo,.
North Amerioan ReTlew, Cl..XXX, February, 1905, 283.
~LIX. 969.

16 "Gravity of the Morocoo Inoident,· Harper'. Weekly, New York,
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agreeing that France had predominant ri"hts in Morocco, beoau•• 01' its neames.
to 'tunia and Algeria, but they were equally will1J:l1 to admit the Geran rights
to upholding the international principle. established by the Madrid 'treaty 1D
1880.

Apin they were divided in their sympathy toward Franoe and Germany on

such important mattere as, whether 'rance be gi"en oontrol 01' the Moroooan
bank, beoause 01' the great oommeroial lntenat, or should the vowing commeroe

between Germany and Moroooo be permitted to grow?

Should France oontrol the

polioe toroe in order to proteot the border di.trlota of her own 0010n1e., or
ehould GermaDy'. plan of an international polioe toroe be reoognized?
But while ... were not 1fholly wUling to g1ve our lupport to either
France or Oe1"ll1&111 where these _tter. _re conoerned, the pubUo and of1'1.01al
opinion was almost unanimous in its baoklng 01' Franoe wh.n the diplomatio
aituation was re"le.d.

I t . s not juat a que.tion ot loeing one or the ••

countries as our triend, but Great Britain, another .8ry interested power,
•• amciously _tohing to ••• what the United Stat• • • s tOint: to do.

Would

the United State. then ri.k ttl present diplomatio status in order to uphold
ite atat...nt that they were dtsinter.lted and un •• lfl.h, or would they beoome
just a little interested and a little selfi'h, in order to obtain a rew
powerful a11ie.?
This diplomatio oorrespondenoe hinted at the an....r, when Mr. Reid
wrote in a _Ieage to Prea1dent Roo.eYe1ta
The truth ....s to me that our relations with England are 01' rar greater
importanoe to u. than thoae wi tb Germany. •• I oannot peraonally ...
anything to be gained from unuaually good relationa with Germa~ whioh

.....
36

compen.ate'" UI tor the lea.t jar in our relation. with Great Britain.l?
Clara Sohieber oontends that the United Stat•• aotually • • proFrenoh in her attitude, ohietly beoaus. Franoe . .s an .nemy ot Germany.

It i.

her beUet that Aaerioa t • attitude _. detinitely anti-Genaan beoau.el
Sinoe 1865 when we LUntted S_te!! bad trouble w1.thGen:aany over the
Samoan q \Batton. the United State. haa drltted eteadlly into dl ..pprO"f'&l
ot GeJ'tJ'ltln XDal1t18rs and methods. . . d1eapproved of her behavior in Chi,.,
almost oame to blow. with her in the Philippine., feared her in the
Caribbean and in South .... rioa. At the __ time our relatlona with
Franoe improwd, ainae France _I Ger_ny'. neighbor and rival. To
e.pha.he our dl . .pproval ot Oerman mil1taria ano imperiali .. , . . Ihowed
approval of French polioy, eapeoially in toreign attaira. It Franae had
been dl.puting with England or Italy in JIoroeco, it is oonoeivable that
American s.yapathy might have been pro-Brittah or pro-Italian and W8 might
have accused Franoe ot militaristio ambition., but Itnoe it _. w1.th
Germany, our sympathie. were whole-heartedly French. 16
That the United Statel

_I

a_re ot what might happen to her

diplomatio relationa with Britain was quite obvlou. troc

~h.

foregoing

atatement., but there was al.o an economic oondition to oon,ider in view ot a
po.aible German triumph.

fhi. waa pre.ented to Preaident Roo,.velt tn a letteJ

trom Henry Cabot Lodge in whioh he .tat.d,
I am very anxioWl that we should do all that 1, poadbl., to encourage
amity with the Frenoh. Franoe Ihould be with U8 and ingland--ln our
aone and our oombination. Such an aUp.ent would be 'OUn" eoonomically
and politically. • •• It would be an evil day tor ua it Germany _re
to oru.h Franoe. 19
.
Another author expre8.ed our tntereated attitude tow.rd Franoe br

17

Alfred L. P. Denn1a, Adventure.

E. P. Sutton & Co., 1928, 607-6.

!!: Amer1can

Dlp1omaol, New York,

18 Clara E. Schieber, Tran.tormation ot Amerioan Sentiment Tow.rd
Germany, Reprinted trom The Journal of Interaatlon..1 Llition., XII, No. I,
July, 1921, 65.
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saying, "Amerioa-- owes

80

much to France that there is not a request France i.

ever likely to make that Amerioa would not deem it her duty to meet."20
Could the United State.

stIll deolare that they were uninterested

in what would happen at the Algeciras Conference, when our diplomatic relations
lwith Great Britain were at stake and when our debt to Franoe must be repayed?
~t is true that the United States sympathized with Germa.ny tor being isolated

~om the Euro~an diplomaoy in Atrica, or at least one writer olaimed it;21
~ut

was that sympathy so strong that ahe would endanger her own relations and

~os8ibly

isolate herself trom the good will ot England and Franoe?
This was not probable, and as the oonterenoe oonvened one Amerioan

lnagadne stated, "With all the Mediterranean powera, inoluding Great Britain
~nd

the United States. approving her position, Franoe has little to fear trom

~n international conterenoe."22 Thi. opinion was oonfirmed by the ottioial
~etter8

of

Presiden~

Roosevelt, whioh will be dealt with in the tollowing

~hapter.

20 Andrew Carnegie, North Amerioan ReView, CLXXXI, 512-13.
21

"Moroooo Conterenoe at Algeoira.," Xation, LXXXII, 31.

22

Elizabeth White, 261.

CHAPTER IV

SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE
Although it is well known that President Roosevelt supported the
Algeeir.s OolU'erenoe in an attempt to Avoid any ,erious threat of war between
Franoe and Germany over the Moroooan question, the aotual inside story ot his
powerful position was not publioly made known until atter the oonterenoe.
Joseph Buoklin Bishop, who had been in President Roosevelt's close
confidenoe during most ot his publio oareer, reoeived a request from the
President to write the history ot the period whioh oovered his publio oareer.l
As a result, all his personal and ottioial oorrespondenoe was turned over
exolusively to Mr. Bishop.
inoidenta, and

aneddo~es

Rooaevelt added to theae doouments, suggestions,

whioh make this work ot great historical value.

ot primary tmportanoe to this paper are the seoret letter, exchanged
between Rooaevel t and the Frenoh Almbassador, Jusserand, and the German
Ambassador, Sternburg, whoa he refers to as Speck, and the Kais.r himself.

--

These letters, whioh were not even published in the Blue Book, show step by
step the prominent part played by Roosevelt in arranging the oonferenoe, and
.ugge!llting

,om.p~ml.e8

between the Frenoh and German. governments. Mr. Bishop

1 Joseph Buo~in Bishop (ed.), Theodore Roosevelt and Ris Time,
New York, Charles Soribner. s Sons, 1920, I, Oh. Xi'Xft, vU.. - 40

atat •• ,

-w..

'"
eervio.
aa peaoemaker

i~

-bhi. Qontrover!IJY

wa. equaled only by tha

which at the same t1me he was rendering to the world in bringing to an end the
war between Russia and Japan.-·

HoweYer, Seoretary Root told Mr. Bishop, "I

oonsider it of far greater importanoe to the world then the Portsmouth
settlement. If!
The souroe of Bishop'.

info~tion

i. in the form of a letter, addreesed on
,Amerioan Ambassador in X.ndon.

oonoerning the Algeolrae Conferen••

Apri~

28, 1906 to Whitelaw Re1d, the

This letter oontains all the oonfidential

oorrespondenoe dealing with this matter.
To supplement Mr. Bishop'S study of the Moroocan situation, another
work, edited by Etling E. Mori.on, adds further light to this problem.'
Despite these two exoellent works a oomplete
investigation of President
.
.
Ro08evelt's writings 1s impossible beeause three important colleotions are not
available, namely, the Leonard Wood, the Henry Cabot Lodge and the George
B. Cortelyon Colleotions.

Moet of the material available for research

1IIOn

oan be found in the Theodore Roolevelt Colleotion the Ubrary of Congrel8.
The story all began on Maroh 6, 1905 when Sternberg oeme to the
President with a message from the Kaiser, asking hi. to join with the Kai.er i'
telling the Sultan of Moroocos
That he ought to refom hie government, and that if he would do eo, the .

•

~.,

46T.

3

~.,

468.

, Etling E. Morison (ed.), the Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
Cambridge, Mas •• , Harvard University Pre.s, 1961, 'iV.

'"
Un! ted States
and Germany would stand behind him tor the open door and
would au.pport him in any apposl tions he might make to all7 partioular
nation Cmeaning FraRoe, ot ooureg which sought to obtain nolulive
oontrol ot )101"0000.

fbie message wal followed up the next day by another note .tating
"the Emperor regarded Franoe and Spain al a 'political unityt who wilhed to
di"ide up IIoroooo between them.el"es and debar her markets to the rest of the
world."e The President answered the

~bove ~te

by statlng, "I do not s ..

~

way olear to intertere in this matter, tor I do not think that our interest.
are suttioiently great."
Germany and to

7

Ue then went on to express his friendlines. to

say that he beli."ed her polioy wal one for peaoe.

The tirlt mention ot a oonferenee came on April 6, when in a
oerrespondenoe with the German Ambassador, Sternberg mentioned that England
and France were allies J and that Germall7 would like a oolderenoe to aettle the
fate ot Moroooo. He went on to say in the words ot the kiler, "Germatl7 asks
tor no gains in MOrooeol she simply detends her interests and stands tor equal
rights to all nation' there.

Selidel this she il bound to think ot her

national dignity.wa Rere we have the old UbWritten imperialiltic rule, ~en
one Great Power seise. an important oolony, it' ri"als may justly feel aggri.,,4 ~
if they be ignored, they should be oonsulted in advanoe, and permitted to se1&41

Ib1d., Letter trom William
e Ibid.
I

-

?

..!2!!.,

a

-Ib1"., -469.

II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.

lAtter trom Roosevelt to 1I1111em. II ,,1s 8ternberg.

J

»

9

~

.omething for thamaelves byway of oompensation."
Another .uggestion came trOll the Kai.er on April IS, when .tating
that, "he believ.d the attitude of England would depend upon the attitude of
10
the unit.d Stat ••• •
Th.r.fore, he urged the United States to tell England
that we thought th.re should b. a oonterenoe.

Again on April 25 and May 11

word oame tl"om the bi.er, through Sternberg urging the United Stat •• to
approaoh England 1n the matt.r ot a oonterenee, and ina1sting that England

n. the one who was opposing thi. oonf'er8l10e. The Kai.er 11.180 mentioned 111
this memorandU1l. that Franoe had made an of'ter to oome to t.rm. but he expn ••••
hl. vi .... in the.e word ••
The Emperor .tate. that hi~ polio,y i. ab.olut.ly olear and .impl.. In
.pit. ot sp.oial advantage,. of'f'fJred to him he .tand. by th., treaty right.
granted to all~ Only if' h., ..hould di.cov.r that h• •hould r.oelve 110
~PpO" ~om the Intereat.d treaty powers in oonn.otlon with the op.n
deor and ~he oonteren.e, he would be toro.d to think of' Ger.many alone.
Only then ~ Nld not betore • h. would have to choo.e between the
po ••lbil1ty of a war with Franoe and the o:am1ning of tho.e oon.dltion.
which hanoe _y have to propo •• ,
a. to avold a war. l1

'0

FollOWing

th~

Kal.er t • letter on May IS, Pre.ident Roo.evelt

expre.sed his vi_ in the .tollowlng way,

It • • •

1 very .1I10erely wish I oould

get England and G.~ into trlendly relation •• ltla
On Kay 29, the lai.er olaimed both England and Frano. had oftered

9 Moon, 202.
10 Bishop, 469, Letter
11

-

trom Willlam II to Roo.ft'elt via Sternberg.

Ibid., "'10.

12 MOrilon, 1156, Letter trom Roosevelt to Ce011 Arthur Spring Rioe

...
a.~

a sphere ot Interest In

1101'0000

It ahe would aooept it and let the

question remain quiet J but he had refused thls otter by saying he was tor the
malntenanoe "ot the statue <luo and tor the open door and tor equal trea_nt

ot all nation, whoae righta were established by treatle•• - 18
Rooan-e1 t' a own atti tude to'W'ard

.

two letters whloh he wrote at thia time.

al~

thl, trouble wa.s let torth in

The til' at was lent to hi' aoting

$e.retary ot State, William Taft, and oontained the following message •
.. , • The Kai.erts plp..dr~ thls week takes the to~ ot Moroooo.
(Sternberg) haa written me an urgent appeal to sound the Britlsh
Govermnent and find out whether they intend to baok up Franoe In gobbliD
Moroooo. • • • I do not teel that as a Government we should interfer. 1a
the )(oroeoo matter. We have other fiah to try and we have no real
lnt.r.st 1n Moroooo. I do not oare to take aldes between Franoe and
Germany 1n the _tter.
$peok:

At the same time it I oan find out what Ger.raany wants I shall be glad to
oblige her lt posaible, ahd I am slneerely anxious to bring about a
better nate ot teeUng between England and Germany• • • • I do not wish
to auggeat anythlng whatever aa to England's attitude in Morocco, but
it we can find out that attitude with proprlety and lnform. the W.er of
it, I shall be glad to do so ••• but we D1Uat not make the English
suspioiou. or lUke them think we are acting al4doo01 duoks for GeI"lB8J1Y
• • • 01', we ahall have to drop the busin••••
In hia s.oond lett.r to Sternberg. he reminded hlm that Rat the

present moment I diaUke taking a position In any matter unle.s I tully
intend to baok it up, and our Inter.sts in Moroooo are not suffioiently great
to make me t.el juatified 1n entangling our Government in the matter. d.5 Re

13 Bi.hop. 411, Letter trom William II to Roo.evelt via Sternberg_
14 Mor180n. 1161, Letter from Roo8evelt to Taft.
15

-

Ibid., 1162.

then explained'" that the other tish we had to try.-Ohina, the Russo-Japane ••
War, Santo Domingo, Ven.,u.la and Panama w.r. taking up a great deal ot hi.
time. Assuring the German Amba.sador, how....er, ot the interest ot the United
State. to help avoid

1I'8.l"

between France and Moroooo. he had instructed Taft

to tind out from Sir Mortimer what the Bn ti.h Government f s views were in the
matter.

Ue oontinued, "I do not think I should go any further than thia at

present."
The.e two letters had been written by Roosevelt while he was

awa)"

froll Washington on a hunting trip, and when he returned at the end ot May,
he m.et with both Juaserand and Sternb.rg. Bis reaotion to conterences was
that a definite threat cf nr did exist between Ge:rm.any and Frano., but he
alao senaed that both men t.lt that a oompromi.e should be made.

Roosevelt

b.li ....ed completely in the truthfulness of both ambassadors. and took them.
into hil oontidenoe.

This was not a mistake on his part, tor the ."ent. whioll

followed proved that without the entire oooperation ot the thr.e, the
luco.aatul agreement could not have b.en reaohed.
In speaklngwith Sternb.rg h. diacovered that the Ambassador did
not approve ot the action hia Government waa taking, but had to baok up it.
position through loyalty.

Th. French Ambaa.ador. on the other hand, upheld

Frano.fs attitude that German)" was aaking tor too muoh, but he did aa)" that
in order to avoid

1I1lr,

1t might be bett.r to yield to Gel"DllUl)", a. tar a. the

oontereno. waa conoerneet.
}low the que.tion ot dealing with the British was quite din.rent.
Rooa.".lt could not ,.t 010'. to Sir Mortim.r, and a conferenoe with him.
r .....aled no more than he alr.ad)" 1m..., that England ....s bitter toward OeZ"lll8.n7.

b

p

and waa

anxiOUI

oontereno..

to

I •• G.l"IJl&Jly

humiliat.d by a refusal trom. Franoe to hold a

Rooaevelt went on to aay.

I did not think thia .howed muoh valor on th.ir part, although troDl
th.ir point ot view it wal Agaoioul, al of oour•• in .uoh a war, where
the British and Fr.noh fl.nl would be united, the G.rman fleetl oould
have done absolutely nothing, while on land, where Germ.arlY was 10
pow.rful, it would be France alone that would stand, and would have to
atand, the brulXb of the battle.l~
It il 11ttle wonder then that Roolevelt decided ahortly atter this
to ignore Ger.many'l appeal tor him to approach England on the question of a
oonterenoe, and to oonoentrate his attention on negotiating direetly with
Frano..

Since England had v.ry little to lose and everything to gain by a

war between Prance and G.l"IIan3", h. felt it ..... u ••le •• to attempt further

dealings with Sir Morti...1".

Be added at thl1 time, "I delired to do anything

I legitimately could tor F1"ance, beeaul. I like Franoe, and I thought her in

thil inatance to be in the righ:ta but I did not intend to take any pelition
whlch I would not be willing at all ooats te maintain ••11

Reolevelt had the •• deei.iona in mind when he r.o.ived anoth.r
appeal trom. the Kai.er on June 11, urging him again to approach England on
the qu•• tion ot a oonterenoe.

Bil new appeal

wa. baaed on the taot. that

Mr. Rouvier, who had replaoed Mr. D.loe.••• , had Ihown a more friendly attltud

to Germany, and had indir.etly llltom.d

the German Charge dtAttaire. in

Paria, that England had made a tormal oftel" to Franoe to enter into an

16

.!2!!.,

17

-

475, Letter fttom Roolevelt to Whitelaw Reid.
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...

ott.live and dot.llvl al1181100 with Eugland whiob would 'bo directed &gab.

Gftrmaay. But do'plte thi. n_ threat ot

1I'Ilr

1mo Kai,.,. t.lt that there

wa.

nlll hope. ItnO., itA" pre.et the leadiDg nate8llell of frelloe are oppo.ect te

._.t

lUob an all18llOe, beoau•• the _jority ot the . . . .n 01 the '1"8I1Oh

atlll hope to oome to a tatl.t. ..,.

Itroag17 VIed BooI..,.elt to

with Qe~. -18 So he

do IOIHth1ng 1.JIae41ately.

take thll otter -.Ie 'by JEnglu.d.

,M~t_pttng

Go~...
n.,_'DIIUtd

or llae Fran.. 1I1gbb

l,,'_ earller

to rule out Roo ....

arpaeat that the Unlted stat•• cUd DOt .1ab to lIlt.rteJlI 'iMoau•• 01 her othol
1lUIIe1"01l'

torel", prob1.1, h. added,

I to.l thai; lt you oould dve .. blat In lM140D aad ill pan. tba" you
would GOllllur a eoDtlrenoe ... the IlIOn _tlataeno". JIlftIl. to brlrag the
Moroooo qu..tloll to a pea. .tu1 IOlutlO1'l, )'Ou would ....... thl peace of
,be world . .ther great lenlOl, wlthout 8DOOW.lMrillg ... rt.k.
After W. ..aIUNIlOO tba' the UaJ. ted stn.a n.ed DOt tear

AD)"

rl.1t

tor her.elt. ho agaiD. ola1Md that he had 'boen ottered "" aphe,.. of lDt1u.oe,t
bY' th. Fl"GIlOh.

~

.iaol

G.~

• • ple4ge4 by hODOr to ltand by'tb. Su1t_.

b. oould not 111 oou01en.. "co.p' tbla ott.r.

In hi. 0WIl word. the Kall.

old, "IUtre 1... ovlou. . . . ,-We _y 'bo toroed tniH» war not " ....u...... ha....

be.n poabblng after people"

laa4, 'but beoaa•••e refu.e 110 tate It.,,19

Dellplte the Kal ....'. oontlaual warrd.ng tbat war wa. in..ltable,
Roo ....1t did not t ••l that tbing' were quit. that bad, .lNt Ilcwertb.l•••• be
prooeecled wl1Jh hi. plan to IUgglat the atteJl' of a oontel".noe to the fNnoh

18 Dld...

-

19 IbU.

.'8, tnt.r fna lfllllM II to Boo.....l' via· Stal"Dbera.
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instead of th.~Engli.h.

.erie. ot oommuD1oation. with the

Thil he did in a

Frenoh Government through Ju••erand.
RooleTelt alsured the French that he wal propolingthil oonterellOl,
because he had a real sentiment for Frenoh J and he would no _re adri.le her t
do

a~hlng

humillating cr disgraoeful for Franoe, then he would it it we,..

his cnm. oountry.

Furthermore, he

war~ed

coutldenoe in the prom,el made by

France not to plaoe too much

England~

beoause in oal. ot a war, it 'IfOul

be France not England that would have to .t"n4 the danger ot inyasion by land

low, it a peaoeful

agreem~nt waf

to be reached some arrangement would have to

be made to help Germany save i tl .eU-re'l>eot, because although

Gel'lllall.)"

be willing to drop the matter ot Morooco at thl. time, she oould not do

Jldgh

'0

graoetully, due to all the publioity that had been g1.'nn to thll question in
reoent monthl. lie then reooJllllended that France aubml t to the oonterenoe. aa

mean. ot helping the ltai.er save his taoe. ae further alsured the French 1Iha
it there waa a oonterenoe ot the Great Power.
Franoe would have flVery reaMn to believe that the conferenoe would not
lanotion any unjust attaok by GermaDJ upon Frenoh intereata, and that it
all 1Ihe Power., or praotically all the Powers, 1n the oonterenoe took an
attltude tavorable to Franoe on .uch • polnt it would be well-nigh
impo.sible tor Germany to a8.ail her. 20
Then he concluded hi. luggeatlon with a premi.e, whlch

110

doubt oonvinoed

France that her interest I in Morocco .ere not 1n danger, tor Roolevelt lald,
I would not acoept the 1nvitatlon of the oonterenoe unle'l Pranoe wal
willing, and that if I went in I would treat both lide. with ablOlute
3unioe, and would, if nece'lary, take very strong groundl againat any
attitude of Germany which .eemed to .e unju8t and unfair.

20

-

Ibid., 478.

Following thia communioation to the French GoTernaeut. oame a reply
on June 28 hom the French MUliater of Foreign Altairs, 111 whioh he said that
the Frenoh Government had agreed to the conferenoe becauae "hia Roosevelt's
ide... and adTioe inspired it. If Rowever, h. presented these nn problema.
First, tha German Ambas,ador refused to di80u,s what matters would be present.
at the oonterenoe, and ola.1Jlled. that Germ&D7 wal merely calling tor a oonter.n~
~,. flo ~eltion

ot torm and ot .tiqu8'bte in order to teat the right ot the

aigua1foi"ypowers to the ConTention of kdrld.

Be assured the French that he

wanted only to inaure the open-door polioy, and that oth.rwi,e Franoe ooull
take up the realization ot her

pro~

Franoe believed otherwis., and waa

anxtous to have a definite program mapped out betore the conferenoe oouvaa.d.
Seoondly. the ni,er had. talcen neps to lntol'Dl the Frenoh 1n Pari, that all
the toroe, of aer.many were behind the Sultan of Moroooo, and,

~e

uses the

moat menaoing language towards us at Washington. at loae, and at Madrid.That the henoh were tald.ng aeriously Roosevelt's promiae to

"-17 strong grounds against
and untair," was

eJ1y

""aD

attitude ot aerallY whioh seemed to .. unjun

qui te evident in. the to llowing m.saage dell"red through

Jus.erand from 'bhe French G,oTel'Dm.8J1t.
tell him that the exoeptional authority .hloh attaohes to hl1 counsel,
not only beoallS. ot hl, ottioe, but also beoause ot hil oharaoter, bis
sens. ot right and jUltioe, and his olear perception ot 'What are the
h1ghest lnter.,ts, quality h~ in supreme degree, to intervene ln favor
ot the -.intenanoe ot peaoe. The insiatenoe with whioh the Emperor hal
appealed to him, hal lett the way open tor the i"s1dent to take the
in1tiativ. that we expect trom hi. friendship. 2

21 Ibid., 480. Letter trom French Kin1ster ot Foreign Attairs 110
Roosevelt Tia Juaserand.
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Following this letter JU8serand and Roosevelt held a oonter.noe in
which they discu8sed the next move to make toward Germany, 8inoe certain
disagreement. had to be straightened out.

Roo.evelt informed Jusaerand that

he would talk with Baron Sternberg immediately.

Sternberg brought with him.

a letter from the Kaiser, stating that he greatly appreciated the ohange whi
was notioes in the policy of Franoe slno. the aotion t &.ken by Roosevelt as
regards the Morooco question.

Ue added, "Your diplomatic activity with

1'.

to Franoe has b.en thegr.atest blessing to the peace of the world. ftll
then wrote three letters to St.rnberg which were to be forwarded to

~qQsevelt

the Iaiser, but before doing so he showed them. to Juaserand in order not to
arouse any ,uapioitm,of double dealing on his

pan.

The l.tter. contained the following atatemeata,
• • • 'lh. Frenoh Gov.rmaent informs me unoffioially through the
ABba ••ador that 1t has ceas.d in its oppo.ition to a oonterenoe of the
pGWeJ'8 1n 1Iorocoo. It leems a. a matteJ' of oour.e that a progl'1!QIl of the
conteJ'enoe would be needed in advance in acoordanoe with the usual
ou.tom. &I! .uch oa.... I suggest that be arranged between Germany and
France. lia
this 8\1ggestion, if followed by G.rmaIl)", would solve the first
problem presented by the Frenoh, but now came the difficult part of warning
Germany not to push the French too tar.

In his most diplomatic lDI'Umer, ha

began by building up the ego of the Kaiser in these words.
oongratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatio suoces. in
seouring the aBsent of the FJ'8lloh Gov.rnment to the holding of this
oonfeJ'eno.. • • I need not say to you that I consider &UGh peacefUl

Let _

22 )forison, 1251, Letter trom Roosevelt to St.rnbeJ'g.
23 Bishop, 482, Letter from Roosevelt to St.rnberg.
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solution••• vitllly n. . . .6J7 to the welfare of the world at thU tl.rle..
vs._ ot it. hav1Dg been .eOtU"flld by the J.}mpet"Ol'" 8\lcoe•• 1n
obta1n1nc thi. OOl.'tt.-enoe. I wish ap1n to apre•• ur,y h~y_~__
lations. It 1•• diplomatio triumph ot the first ~tude." and 1n

Roo......lt then expla1nM why be had approaohed Fl'anoe aM not
Eu.glaQd Gn tbe queatlon ot the tJOttf'wenoe" crtating that England bad noth1nc
to 10•• and 'WOuld probably pront' p'etdily by the loBB of

G~'

oolont••

fllD4 t1Mb. ne CUURll'"ed the KalBO,.,. as he bed prftiouB1y aeaur«t the J'renoh.

that be would advl.e

Ge~

h.. in tbe eye. of the world.
IUggeation. to

~

to do DOthing whloh Wtlld humiU,ate aDd diagraM

In f'e..ot he wou14 not have ott.ad hi'

unle .. Germany bad Ul"pct hSa to work tor the

eo~......._

1n the flret plue. Jut .ino. be had spokeD to FwAsloe and I1noe the
ROe

ft. apa.d upon. b. felt lt hi. obligatlon to

of' hi. vlen. With tM.• latroduotol"Y " •••18

ocmte:r-

maD a .fttrother .t;ateMtD.\

ot oongatulat1ona

and expla-

nation of hi. rea.one tor nat1ng hi. opinion at thi. time. Roo .....1t
proo.e4e<1 with tbe lmponant pan of' M. 1nter.
• • • I tft1 that .tlOIr.. bItriAg obtalne4 what he Lib. ltala-i7 aalta. So"
would be moat UIlforbunate eva to .... 'to rel.. questloDl about mlz:&ol'

clftal1•• to ... 1t un4.r 8UOh oil"OUIDItanoq the dne.df"u1 oalud.t7 of war
Gh&u14 bappetl" I fear tthat h18 hlgb and hor..ol"ab1e f.e mlgllt be o~
ae baa _n .. ;reat tnumpb, be hal obtain_ what hl. oppoileDt. lrl
JDgland and.
IIdd M DeftI'" wuldolrba1u.. aDIl what X . . .U 414 IlO'b
be11,,,," be oould obta.ln. the r.wlt 18 a ltr1ld.ug tribute to bbl'D4tl
v.~..aIl-t
a111' D.O le•• tball ~ hi. aatlon. and I .arne.tly hope that be 08A • •
M • •1 olear 1;0 a(IMpt lt .e tb. triumph it 1••81

'reno.

For ......l"a1 . . . tollorll.rlg thl. . . .sage to

24

Jl.!!."

~

tbeH . . a

I..etsWl" tnm Roo......l, to Wl111am It•.

26 MoI'laon.. 126'. Ltrbte1" from Roo...,..1t

1:;0

Steft4berg.
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great deal of blokering between the Frenoh and Germane over the progre.. of
the oontereno., and 1t looked: doubtful whether hoh a m.ettng 'WOuld take plao
Once again Sternb.rg and Jua.erand oame to Rooley.lt tor a

after all.

solution, and h. advl ••d th_ both to .end the tollowtng ••••age to their
Gove1"D1lGta t

"The two Govel"tml4n\. oon.ent to go to the coat.renoe with no

progr. ., and to di.ou•• there

all

course where elther il 1n honor

q~e$tlona

'bou~

In regard to MOrooco, aave ot

by • pJ!lI'fiou. agreement 'With another

power."ae Jle then atated that he dld not want &r17 publlolty to b. given to
him tor hls work on the oonferenoe, 81noe he 'WOuld rather 11'1 b. thought that

Frano. and GermanY' came to the agreement

011

th.tr

OWD..

loth gov.rnments agreed to thls auggestlon and

G.~ ~ded,

"that 111 ease during the confer.noe dU'f.rence. of opinlon should. aria.
between France a.n4 Ge~, he /jhe KatHil 1n ....ry case will be 1""""'1 to
baok up the deolalon whloh you [Roos8Vel~ .hould oonsider to be the

moo

tall" and the most praotloal.".'
J

!hl. d..,ls10n wal reaohed on June 28, and al the conference was
not to begin untl1 January 6, of oourle a new problem aro.e ln the meantime.
The latler became worrled about where the oonterence would be held, and who
the Frenoh 'Were sendlng a. a delegate.

Ue 'Wanted. the meetlng to be at

Moroooo and he did not want· the Frenoh to lend Revoll al a d.alegate.

The

26 Bishop, 485, tetter from Roosevelt to Sternberg and JUI.erand.

-

27 Ibid., 481, Letter from Sternb.rg to Roolevelt.
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matter waa oleired up quiokly end then Rooa.,.elt informed Jua.erand that
.ince the Gonterenoe had been arranged to save taoe tor the Kai.er, he would
.ugge.t that "the

Fre~ch

Government should not let their people boaat or be

disagreeable and try to humiliate the leaiaer in conneotion with the coaterene
beoause the important point wal tor them to pis the kernel ot the nut, and
they did not have to consider the 8he~1.ft28
Although Roos.,.elt's trust in Gel'JlllUlY concerning the oonterence _ •
• haky, he put complete confidence in Sternberg, whom he .t"ngly auspected
was not himselt in tavor of Germany'. policy, but at this time he also became
unsure of France, and it waa only hia taith in Jul.erand that enabled h1m te
negotiate with contidence.

Gel"Zll1D.y .eemed moat anxious at this time to ....ur

the Un1 ted State. that all the Power. exoept England . .re bacld.ng her at the
conferenoe, although botb Ru.sia and Italy pleaded with u. to dosomethlng to
keep Gel"1ll&J1Y hom gaining a sphere ot in.tluence in

.1'0000.

Of oourse n

lmew Austria was in favor of Germany, but Roosevelt knew that Austria was ..
ure 08:t'a-paw tor Germany_
It aoon bee..e olear that Germaaywa. departing from her original
plea tor the open-door polioy 1n Moroooo, aince ahe began demanding a port
tor herself', and. then a .eapon tor Holland or Switaerland, adjaoent to her

own, whioh would 1n the eyea of the other diplouts, .,.entually beoome
Gel"Jl8B1's.

The French retlased to g1:"e in on the.e points and the United

States' view was announoed as "the intereats of France and Spain in Morocoo

28

.!!!!!_,

Ch. XXXVII.

488, Letter from Roosevelt to Ju•••rud.

are tar veater" than thoae of other

po1Nl"8. tt29

On lartue.ry 29 Gel"lllN17 suggeated and aaked the Un1 ted State. to

propo.e "to entrust the Sultan of

1101"0000

wlth the organtlation of the poli..

foroe. within hia domaina and to allow him. oertain tund., and to establ18h
art international oont1"Ol w1th regard to the management

ot the.e funda, and

the oarrying out of the whole plan. "SO. The United State. of oourae did not
favor .uoh a pl8l'l beoause French interena were far more important in tbl.
reglon end 1f the Sultan were given such power., lt waa quite likely that he
would f .....or the German.. whOle lntereata were Do1J

'0

long .tending nor ••

predominate aa tho •• of the French.
Therefore O'n February 19. Roo ...... lt instruoted Elihu Root to send
the follow1ng plan to the Kai.er. which he oalled a modll108.tlon of

Ge~t,

augge.tion.
1. That the organization and maintenanoe of polioe toroe. in all the
port. be entrusted 'bo the Sultan, the men and offloer, to be 1Ioors.

That the money to maintain the foroe. be furniahed by the proposed
tnternational bank, the stook of which ahall be allotted to all the
powera in equal ahare, (exoept for some emall pref.renoe. olaimed by
Franoe, which he oonsider. immaterial).
2.

s. that duties of instruction, disoipline, pay and aa.i.ting in
management and control be entruated to Frenoh and Spaniab oftloer. and
non-commissioned officer., to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation
of name. by their Legations.
fha'b the Senior FreJlOh and Spanish instructing offioer. report
annually to the ~~~ent at MOroooo, and to the government of Italy,
the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspeotion and

29

.!!!!..

30

-Ibid.. 490.

489.
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verit1oation, and to demfU).d further report. in behalf of and tor the
information ot the Power.. The expense ot auoh inspeotion, eto., to be
deemed a parb of the cost of the polioe maintenance.
4. That lull a.aurance be given by. Franoe and Spain, and made obligato
upon all their otficer. who ahall be appointed by the Sultan, tor the
opendo.or, both a. to trade. equal treatment ftd opportunity in
competItion for public works and conce.aiona.

Roosevelt then concluded by aaying that in such
Germany

8A

agrs. .zrt

would be cons.rving her prinoiple of the open door, and France would

be making conce.sion. wb1ch it would be entirely possible for her to make.
therefore, ttl think it is talr, and earneatly hop. that it may receive the
Raperorts approval.Germany"
faotol'y.

reply- to the toregoing program was not, how..,.er, sati..

As to point. 1. 2 and 4 they were given approval with the oendltion

that the ..cond point, the question of granting France a slight preterenoe,
be di.ous.ed.

But 1r.t regard to the third point GermaD7 ...... strongly oppo.ed.

They Itated that this was in tact the main gi.t of the lateat French propo.al,

N44 t;hat

Chtl"J'.ll&lly 'ftS

objecting to lt on the ground. that euch a .et-up would

plaoe the polloe toroe. ent.irely in the hand. of France and Spain.

To rem.,.

thi ••ituatloD the _perol" 'uggeated,
••• that the Sultan ahould have a tree oho!" among the other nation.
• • • al'Jd in cas. France ahould tear that under the pre ••t condi tiona

the Sultan m1ght tavor Gel":ll'W1 otficer., that at least tour difterent
nationalities should be taken 1nto oenalderation in an equal manner.
Ultimately, so as to aoknl')W1«'.ge the .peei8.1 ri~t. ot Franee 1n
Moroooo, the Sultan might place the po11oe control 1n Tangiers. and
perhaps in .ome other po.ri, entirely in the bands ot hemoh ot:tioers.

-

31 Ibid •• 490-1.

z
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In all the other ports offloers of varlous natlons would oooperate. 31
The Kalser then added that he hoped the Prelll1dent would broaden his proposal
for mediation aooording to the above plan.
It 18 qul te olear from RooI..,.elt t s reply that he
g01l1g to treat Germany 111 a gentle manner.
that he oould ask France to make

~

ftS

no longer

Ue atated that he did not feel

further oonoes.ions, and that he would

11ke to drop the entire matter, but telt 'that ,sinoe he had luggened the
oonrerenoe he would like to do ell he could to &Told a war.

RemincU,ng the

Kai.er again that he had suggested the oonterenoe only because of
urging., he aapha8iaed the Kailer t

•

Ge~.

willingne.s to oooperate by quoting the

following passage troa a letter of June

as,

19051

The Emperor has requelted ae Sternberg to tell you that in ca.e,
during the ooaing oonterenoe, d1fterenoel of opin1on Ihould arile
between Franoe and Germany. he. in fJVerr oase, will be ready to baok up
the deoision whith YO'Q should oonsider to be the most tair and the
mon praotical. $1
Ue continued,
under the oirouutanoes, I feel bound to nate to Your lIajest,.

that I think the arrangement lndioated in my letter of Febrt.ULlT 19ish i.
a reasonable one, and moet arneatly urge Your kje.t,. to aocept it. I
do not know whether Franoe would aooept it or not. I think she ou~ to
do 10. I do not th1nk that she ought to be expeoted to gt) further.
ne pOinted out that if Franoe agreed to auoh an arrangement, ahe

32

.!!2!.,

33

-

492, Letter trom William II to Roolnelt via Sterbberg.

Ibid., 49S11

34 Ibid., 493-4, Letter from RooI..,.elt to William II.
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would 'be giT1ng 1ll to the extent that she would have joint responsibiUt,.
with Spa1.n, and would be an....rabl. to all the other Powers tor the _1llten8ll
of these right..

III addl tton Gel'llB1'lY would have tult111ed her

purpo..

in

ealling the oentereneM, namely, the prinoiple of open-floor. As an additlonal
W8.l"B1ng, Roos."elt ..14,
• • • I ,.. grave reaaona to apprehend that 1t the eonterenoe should tat
beeaus. ot Germa,nyt s inslating upon pre.dng Fran_ beyond the _asure 0
oono•••ion de.ribed in this proposed a.rrangement, the general OpWOIl 0
Europe and America would be untavorable, and Ge1"mllllY would lo.e that
inor....e of oredit and moral power that the maklng of 'bhis ~
would seoul'4t to her. and. Ddght b. held re.pon.ibl. probably tar beyond
the Um! ta ot ..eaeon. tor all the ml. tha'b . y GOJU in the train of a
dieturbed oon41tton of affair. in Europe. • • throw upon France the
reepon.lblU:by tor Z"ejeoting, it i'b 1. to be reject.d, the nggened
arrangeraent. 85

The Ial.er replied by again 'bhanking Roos.....lt tor hi' hard work in
trying to solv. the probl __, but added that after givlng oonsiderabl.

thoug~

to the matter, h. nill telt that some alteration should be mad. to IDHtl the
1nt.rnational ,ide of the qu.stion,

aln.. Franoe nu14 be obtaining a Gena

mnopoly in 1Ioroooo which would not result in .conomio equality tor the eth..
nations.

Be then Rid that Auatrla-Bung&ry' had IUbmitted .. plan whioh h.

telt would be ..gr....bl. to Rooaevel t and the other Powera. !his plan contalD
the tugg.ations th..t instead ot entrusting the .rooo&11 porta to oontrol by
'bhe Spanish and Frenoh jo1ntly, all eight po:na ahould be dlstributed.
Aooord1ngly. the plan of dlatrl.butlon thould work ae tollo1l'8'

the poliee in

tour porta ahould b. organ1 ••, by the French, ill thr•• the poll.. should b.

as

.!2.!!..

494-6.
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...

organized by the Spanieh, end the laat either the SwiIS or the Du'beh. abould
organi.e the polioe.

16

!he United Statea objected seriously to tni. suggestion because
they telt 1t ..... oonttu'Y to the very prinoiple tor which the conference na
held, namely, prcv1ding tor the open door.

It would mate little differenoe

according to the Original prinoiple wbe'bher Franoe were given cOD:brol of all
the porta or whether they were distributed aocorci5.ng to the Auatrian plan.
Germa'lly then ..,aured the United Stat.e that tbey ..ere

lOrry

that

their attitude had relulted. 1n certain m1aunderatand1nga, but that they ..ere
oenain theae miaunderatanding. would be r8llOved eaal1y.
By 'bbi, t1me Pre,idet Roo • .".elt ft.a becom1ng weary ot the

biokering employed by Ge1"DUUl)" over the control ot the polioe 1n the ports and
he aent the toll.o1ring meaaage to the klaer, which he had tormerly given
verbally to Sternberg.
• • • 1f the Emperor peraevered in rejecting our propo,..la and a. breakup ensued. I abould feel obliged to publish the entire oorre.pondenoe,
and that I believed that our people would teel a grave auspicion ot
Germany· 8 juatloe and good faith. but if the Emperor would yield to
what .eem.M to me OUF very tair propoeall, I should not publ1ah any ot
the oorrespondenoe, and Wfj!uld endeavor in every way to g1 ve Germany full
oredit tor what was done.!7
fhia evidently.a. exaotly what the Kaiaer did not want the world
to know, tor the publication ot theae document. would throw a very untavorabl
light, upon

G.~.a

16

81

-

aotion.

They had demanded a conterence with the

Ibld., 498.

-Ibide,

600, Letter trom Roo.flYelt to William II.
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4eo1aration thlt their .01. lntent ft. to uphold the principle of the
~or

lXl

~D1

MoJ"OOoo~

o~n

!he eone.ponden04J of tbl. periad r ....ealed, hewner, that

-p.. aotually .eeking ._.thing for her.elf.

In add!tion to hoping to

aoquire .cae territory, Germany allO wished to make the other European
ooulltrie. re..119 that Germany
theretore,

ft.

now one of the Great Power.. and mtUJt ..

be 00118U1ted in matter. of international importanoe.

By agreeing

to the plan of Prelident Roosevelt they would be given oredlt for the suoce••
of the conterenoe, an4 thereby" re.el ve the public &oolala tor which they
lought.
A tew daya atter receiving the Prelident'a proposal, Germany yield
to hi" plan.

frue to hia wrd, Preaid.at Rooane1t gave G8l'1D&Jly the ored1t

he had promised them.

On April 12, 1906 while addreasing a group ot German

"9'trberana he Itated,
• • • It i. not out ot plaoe in ololing tor . . to aay a word ot
oongratulation. both to the Ge:rman people and the German Emperor. upon
the wor'kthaii hal b.en Moompliahed :l.n the Algeoiral Conterence wh10h
hal juat ololed. a Oo~eren•• held ohiefly because ot the 1n1tiatly. ot
GeJ"lllaDy.$8

lAter, when lpealdng ot this inoident President Roo.evelt .ald, -In
thl, A1geoiraa matter. you will notlce that while I ft. ''WITe and p1ea.lU1t
with the Emperor, yet when lt became n84e ••vy e.1: the cd I nood h1a on hi.
head with great d.al.10n.-19
fhe.e letter. which were &ddre.,ed to Whlte1aw Reed, and oopie. ot

-

38 Ibid., 501-2.

r
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which

_1". to o. sent to

Meyer and White, were requetted by the PNsidetrb.

"to be consider.d as of the moat atriotl,. confidential oharaoter.-40

Forbunately

ta~

us the.e letter. did become public

different light on the situation.
1» realiz. Germany"

Wltho~t

th...

ana

shed an entIrely

~~would

have been difficult

true prupe •• in demanding the aonterence, and would hav.

lett the offioial Am.el"ioan attitude
in the eye. of the world.

t~d

the trouble 111

1101"0000

uncena1n

AMERICAN ATflTODE '.rOWARD mE RESULtS
OF 'l'BE OOIFERE.IOE

idore ia.ventgating the American attitude toward the ..e.ultl ot
the Algeoml centerenee, the following were the provisionl ot the General.

.Aet,
~. fbe iD.4epell4. . . ot )(01"0000 ftS ..eoop1.ed in the preamble.
2. GoveJ'lllUllt tinanoel 'ftl"e to be entruated to a state Bank at '.rangier,
JJUU:l.aged b7 tour oeuon appoint", reapeotl".elY', bY'the Dmsohe Bank•.
the hnk 01 Engl", and Banqu••• hem_, and the Bank ot 'paill.
!he ..pl tal .... to be aublorlbld 1n equal parta by the .ignatory
power.. exoepting that haae. ahould have the larger ahul.
S. Cult. . duties Are placed under international supen1.a1on.
4. Cono•• slona or oontraata tor publl0 Yorke were to be granted upt'J1
im.partial ad.3ud1oat1oJ1, wh1ch would aooept; the moat tavorabls bld.
reprill.. ot the nat10nall ty ot the bidder.
5. A toroe ot 2,000 to 25,000 arm.e4 Moroocan poliN wa. to be organia.,
under 16 to 20 French and Spaniah ottieerl, all4 30 to 40 Frenoh ana.
Spaniah lUbaltvu.

'lbe otfioerl _uld be Spu1.h at el"ain ports, Fretloh at other.,

and mixed at the rest.
However, the whole police administration was to be .upervised by a

Swi.s oftieer., .a :mapenor General. l
It 'WOuld appe8l", on the surtace.. that Germany fta ".iO'bcrioul in

1 American Journal of International La1lf' (Supplaell'b), H. York,
Balce.., Voorhis &: do., 1901, 1,41.56.
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obtain1Dg their demand.. 81n08 international oontrol ot Iloroooo wal subnitut
for Deloa".'a plan ot enabliahing a French proteotorate over IOroooo.
However, France had lucceeded in .llurlng her.eU of the supports ot Englan4,
the neutrality of Italy $lld 1flle trtelldl1De•• of the United Stat... 80" while
fran.e wa. unable to &Ohi...e her lmme41ate objeot, ahe

now that ahe Gould nuriber

.0

DO

doubt felt atronger

many great power. ameng her friend..

!ba1l

PFe.ldeD.t l.oo • ..,.e1' lided with the frenoh il quite evident after viewing the
leoret letters of th1s period, and that moat of the Ameriean pUblie agre04
with the outo. . of the oonterence oan be leen from. the oblenation' made bJ'
the pre.. • although they were not exolu'i""ely pro-French.
8oDt4 of the les. obl.rv1l1g OGlD.ent. oonoeJ"D1ng the reaultl ot the

oonterenoe. lUllllJJU'"iled the oute. . al a gain tor both

Ge~

md France_ and

al.o a 101. tor both oountrie.. The.e eon.lusion. were ba.ed on the t&Ot.
that Franoe gained

&Xl

international aokrlowledpent of her ol.a1ma to speoial

right. in territor1al, administrative, and finanoial lnterest., that .he
gained oontrol of the polioe in tour important port. and control with Spain
of two cnherl J and that the J'reneh o1alm to a vea"'er ahare in the )Ioroeean
State leak

t;han

the other powers

ft.

agHe4 to b7 the Gonterenoe.

On the

other haDd, France was not allowed to enabliah a frenoh proteotorate of
IIoroooo. 8 Gel"JJl&Dy' at the same time gained by torcing Franoe to plaoe the
entire polioe ot Morocco uud.er an in.peetor, ad to oompel the Frenoh to

63

admit Spain a. --" dual ool'lvol of the _rocOq poll0.. A. to what ..... 1....
by

G~.

lt .... ola1m.a. by the Germazt Colonlal Sooiety' and the

Pan-Germauo

League, although not oltlolally approved by the bl ••r.. that the ohi.f hope

of Ge1"Dl&l1Y . a to g.t oontrol of
important oOlllD.erolal oono•• l1on..

id4taa

of

on.

of the JIoroGcen

pon.

In W •• ot cour....

and al.o .f

til..,

.tailed. 3

the Un •• , another 1tud.7 pointed out that "both the

Reading

~en

Ge~

&Ad the polloy ot I'ra.noe have be. pr••e"K by the

.ot'l1.81_.'" !he author ....11.1= on to explain that the French poU..,. of pennratlon lnto Moroooo waa atill poa8ible, through th.1I' almoat unqu.nlone4 oontl"O
of the poli.. aDd bank, but that the French had motUfled ».1.....' . plana.

Ge.rJrtany"

Id••

01"8

pres.l"Ved in 'bhat ah. auat be oOl1wlt.d in Ked1tenoan...

matter.. llow$Ver. It 1. doubttul. whether tbl. r.ally was a pm hr hJl!/ll.t.l17',
aiD•• the v1rtual 1101at1011 of G81"JD1\1'1y' wa. &pp81".nt at the

oont.1"8noe. A. waa .tated prmoul1y ha.noe

ft.

ta.

01 the

a••ur" of EIlgl..d"

Appon,

the neutrality of Ita17 and the fri.endllne., ot .A.ilwrloa. Add to ttll. 'bhe

probabls aupport of Ruesta. once they reoover.d hom th.lr wa.r with iapea, an4
lt leave. only Aunrla-Rung&l7 a. an ally tor Gel"JlNlY.
In dl.ousa1n.g the oombined Spanlah and Frenoh control of the poll"

in MOrooco, .tlll another oonolu.lon ..... logical. 'raRo. actually dtd not
10.. anybblng in agneing to 'bhl. jolnt oentrol beoaus. 1D. an .....11.1"

agreement

~.

-

with Spain, b.fore attempting to

pu~

into 1101"0000. Franoo ha4

8 Ibld•• 788.
4:

"Outcome. tf lIiatlon, LXXXII. April 5. 1906. 216.
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recogrd.aed certain rights 01 Spain to this _"ito17 ud 'bhua, had hiILt" a'b

allow1ng Spain to help them in poUeing the tel"l"ltory, should they aucceed in
armexing it. 5 So when P'l"anoe agreed to thl. daaand of the delegate at the

oOllference, they.ere probably putting 1nto operation the very plan tMy,
thatelve. had entertained for IDIU!l¥'

rear••

While France, then could vi_ with pnde the oonorete gaiu they
had ma4e as a result of the eonterenoe,

G~

felt that they ha4 saved fad

in the eyea of the world.· It waa thia argument that President Roo.....lt ba4
uae4

to eonvinoe the Kaiser to come 'to terms at the a ••emb17, when wv

threatened.

It _y have been an empty honor that

~

had ma1Dtalned, in

their right to be oonsulted in lIediterranean affair., but in the diplomatl0
relation. of the European ooulltriea. it was an all 1mportan'h honor,
to Germany, who

..,.oiall~

wa.. without ftJ"Ong alU •••

U the statement made by the Pan-Germanio League and the

Ge~

Colonial 800iety had not been _de known to the rest of the wr14, eono.rn1ng
the German plan to galn oontrol of a lfol"OOoan port and lmportant

OODII'Ilel'ol~

oonce.sion., the Ge1".l1lan po.it10n at the centerenoe may have bHn received 1n

a very favorable 11ght. Iv1denoe of thi a oan be •••n from a popular Amerioan
attitude apr•••ed ju.at a fft day. prlor to the relea•• of the atat-.ent
ma4e by the above societies.

thia particular anicle waa quoted by an

American periodical, atter it had first appeared 1n Englan4. and 1t baoked
Git1"lll8l1Y in i 'ba d.and for a conterence by e.dm1ttlag that, "Ge~ waa

5

"Outcom.e," 14.;v:1ng!l!.. CCIL, April 28, 1906, 242.
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morally and. llplly junU1.ed 1n dHl1a1ag to acoept the Anglo-French
agreement 1n re.peo1J to

)(OroO('lO,

beoaWlI it, too, was

Madrld Contereno. 1». 1880.,,6 '.rhu., 1t

GeI'JlCUly

slgaatory ot the

a

were merely upho1cU.ng thi.

inteJ"J1atlonal pr1n.clple of the &p4tn door 1D. lIoroooo, any Aa.ri08.l1. lIIOu14 ao
doubt have alded with

Ge~

&p1nat 'rance, but once their on .ell1ah

intereat. beoaae ..,.l'4ent, thelr IUppoz:ter. became t.er.
Certainly the oftl01al reault. of the coatereno.
t.ll the entire ROJ')" of the ge1na and 10.... of the . .

pow....

agr.~t

JIUt at

414 Bat

1n.t.reated

One author 1I'4hlt 10 far a. to olala that the oft101al relUl.t. JIl8.tterea.
/

to no one, and that the main question
the OVerlord of Evope, without

wa., "I. W.er Wilhelm. to be tre.:tJect u

-.m..•• author:batlon

DO

treatle. or oomentlou

are b1nd1ng."" S. oontbluN by 1nterpre1iing the "eol.10n with the.e word.,
"JIo. • • he i. no1; yet the ling of Ung. and Lord. of Lori•• "

great pleasure that tbl. aubhor sa

Ge~"

It

wa_ with

plau of gaining gnund in

IIoroooo haltect, for h. addN, "Prlnoe Bulow without

~

repen'banoe adm1tted

after the oonteraoe, that GeJ"lll8rlY'. alleged oomm.erola1 1J:J:tereat

wa.

jun a

.oh. . . "S
A more pe.aUdatl0 refleotlon on the re.ulting ooatr.l of Moroooo
by Europeans, written shortly att.r the oonferenoe oomened, expnlaed the

6 Edwvd Dioey, "Statement of I.ne. Involved," Eoleotl0 Jlae,ln.,

evIL, Aprl1, 1906, 329•

., E. J. Dillon, "Europe Retu... to Reoognize an Overlori."
Contsor!!l Review, LXXXIX, May.. 1906. 729.

-

B Ibld., 734.
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belief that trie Sult811 would m.erely oont!Jau, to play one for.iga ooUJl'bl7
aga1nft another. a. he had done 121 the

pan. 9

Even should one nation be

aarded the ript to Int_".e. great obataole. 'WOuld make this diffioult to
o~

out.

Foremost among the.e dlffioultl •• would be that of religlon,

11noe the Sultan i. not olllJ' 'the temporal head of the oourmry. but al.o the
religious head. Axr:i interterenoe by.France

01"

allY' other ooun1:ll7' with their

reUg1ou. leader might re.ult in .erioua riot. on the part of the native••
Geographio oonditlon. were al.o oon81dered unfavorable, due to the laek ot
railroads. good road ••

tele~aph

line.. and bridge..

Furthermore. ta

visuallzing Franoe at the head of the adm1Jl1etrative deptiU"'tment in .rooco 1#
another problem ui.e•• namely that of enforcing the law. 1'Ih1oh they JU4e.
Sheuld France pin eontrol of the ouetome hou.e., ahe would 8till find it
neGe.aery to .eek additional taxe.. elaawhere. Bare. the trouble would
"nainly begin. linoe the Sultan had alway. been foroed to uk for muG more
than he needed in order to

&88U1"8

hira.eU of getting the n.....ary money.. art.d

then he otbengot 1t. only aft.r .ending hi. foro •• out to oolleot it.10 nth
th••e in mind it 1. 11ttle wonder why any European oourmry would want to
oontrol

1101"0000.

!he American repre.entatlve. Henry White. expre.sed hl. oplnion ot
the henoh e.nc1 German delegate. to the collteren_ by aaying •
• elther Franoe DOl" o.rm.any aent me of fir.t rate abl11ty_ II. Paul

9 E. Kontet, WUOl"oooan

1906. 255.

-

10 Ibid., 257.

Queatlon.~ Outloo~,

LXXXII, February 3.
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.,

..t

Revoll, the FrellCbman "flU In.geD1ou., subtle and word,. ln hi. argqm.ent.,
but .in" hi. gGvermaeniJ had l1ttle oontideno8 11l h1m. he n.a cout&J11Jly
aot1ag under d1Hot order. from Pul.. The Ge:m.an.
Herr VOIl
bAnit. and a.n a.s1.tazrb Oowm !attellbaoh. !a'bteribaeb '0011 took ehu'p
...A was trmz-ight, ill-tem.pttred and tUlable to ••• fIZ1'1 point ot vi_ but
hi . . . . .

fo ud to the trying oond1tion. ot the conteren.e, Henry White
pelat.d that the

n_apa~r

.en ....r. vetoy

the 'nnoh, who ..ere connantly pouaolng

~C
Oil

to the delepte., "e'peola1

th_ with queation•• "lJ fhi."...

oontradiotol'Y to anoth.r .b.erva1:10. MAl, here 1D Juri_ whloh lauded the
hench for "attempting

1;0

avoi'd war talk again.t de~ during the center,

then'b,. _ldllg Gel"Dl8.D1 and not han., look like the aggre.sor. "11

,

Ib.. the f1nal deol81oll was reached by the repr•••1Jatlve. of tbe
Or...'b Powers, ish, treaty waa pre.ented to the U!lited State.' Senate

ratifioatlon.

tor

thi. tr""7 waa ra'bit1ed and to it was added an explaaa'blou.

that the particl patlon

ot the UD1t,4 Stat..

ill the .oat,renee .... du. to tbe

taot tb..t ebe hael I1p.d the t,.eaty of Jladrid in 18S0.14 AMl"ioa.... .tlU
o1a1mS.ng. th••, iIhat the:y ....,.. 1apanlal and unin"reated t.n who _n t .....OI" la
lIoroooo, but

ft.

only bt.raned 1n upbo1418C the tnt.rational prin01ple, of

'he Mattr1d treat,.. Bow.,...., the author i, nmftbat akeptloal. be11 ....1ng we
hac! a ctet1ai te inte.lon of helplng

han...

In 8U1IIIIlrialq 17.,1*"

11 Allan • ..nu. 264.
12

13

-

Ibid.. ITS.

"Ou'boome.· »at10n, LXXXII, Aprl1 5, 1906. 271.

14 Altred L. P. Denni., 510.

:

:i

...

9

...
polioy, he state.....at people thought that

Roosevelt"

Rooa~elt

waa hand i

glove with the Kal ..r, yet his tinal at8.l'1d .... unquestionably in support; of

It 1. interesting to IIOte at this time, 'bhat Franoe who hftsitated
111 agreeing to the conterenee. tared muoh better than hm.any, who had urgt'd
Preaident Roo.evelt to obtain the oOmJent of France to the oontercoe. Not
only did France gain aotual privl1ege', but alao the support; of many friena.a,
among the.e the Amerleans.

One author attributed thls auooe •• to "the

moderation and juatioe of the Frenoh oontention at the Algt'olraa Conterenoe,
wh10h have peen gradually but 8I1rely appealing to the good aen.e of the rest
of the world, and 5. t may be .aid that the Frenoh cue i. could.rably bette
ain" the oonterenoe openecl••15
!he

Henry Whl

t.,

!!!!!!:! Times

in 8U1IIID&1"1dng the opln1on of our delegate,

atated.

Jfr. White, the Amerioan delegate, is of the opinion that tho result
of the oont.renee i. a8&tisfaoto17 one, not emly b.caus. the baHiat.
future of Moroooo is aeour", but beoaus. the manner of the aettlament
1. aati.1'acrtJory both to 'l'U1oe and Ge~, removes the cause, for
friotion, aDd re.torea international relation. to a normal oondition.
!he prinoiple, for whioh Gel"lDNlY inSisted, the integrlty of Meroooo an4
~al oommeroial aDd eoonolde right' there, ....re rMogn1ZU' while the
apeola1 position, olaimed by Franoe, also wa. reoognized.

Little real1llng that the trouble wa_ not over in l(o:roooo b. . . . .

270.
16

!!! .!!!.!l'1aea.

April 1, 1906.

.
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the Frenoh EU'ld Germane, but was to continue on until 1911. ms:ny opt1mistice.lly
observed at th.. cl0.. of the conferenoe that the peace of Europe had been

...

Slao. \he Algeolrae Conterea.. dld Dot per.manoatly ..ttle the
trouble ia Moroooo, thl. atucly would nOt be ooaploto without a brief ~

ot how France ... "hIe to lueee.ltully oarry out her pl_ ot ma.ld.Dg a
proteoto~te

ot

~rooto.

Sbo"l,. affIer the oOllolualon ot the oontena". 4110rder. b:roke out
la »oroooo 'IIh1oh France felt oallod tor lnton_t10D.

'lho firat ot theae

oabt:>etJca ooourred wheD Sir 1Ie..Z7 )faoLe., a Brlt1ah aubjeot, f t l captured b,.
Ra1IUU., the bandit. an4 hold tor a nmeOJll ot It 20,.000. 1 rul, ot cov,e,
brought internatlonal attentloD aca11l 'to the )Io1"oooan l1tuatlOD. The seoond
d1sturbanoe .ame about bHauee "'he Sultan ha4 bo.. ooatonlng wlth the
Eur.peau

ill

order to

COil.....

oerta1n priv1lege. and t:>lghtl to thea. Mulay

liatld, a brother of the Sultan, organised s«eral warlike tribe.

1;0

rebel

aga1Ut the Sultan. 1 Stl11 another cauo tor lnto~10D roaultec1 when at

CaeabIee., the Sh.-1ya tr1be-"1l hoard that the French and Span1.h 1NN
pIeum1ng to butld a railroad through a "'11_

~ete1T.

they lmmec11ate17

invuK the tna and ldlled lIVeral Eunpeau, among _om were .... henchman•
• u

1

)focll,

201.

I

!!!.!!!!: fha•• ,

I

Oooke and StlOkney, 112.

J'oveber 25, 1901.
10

'11

fhe Frel1Ob. retallatttd by • •41ng an

~

ooouW Caaablau.oa and the 'U1'T0W34ing tenltoJ"7.

ot three 'bhouear.u1aeu t.

Strangely enough, the hZ'DU

414 not rai.e a ••r10ul objection to the oooupatlAn ot Caaablanoa by the

n.

Frenoh. but; .e1'10u. eli"atisfaction wu Ihowa by the native., who agaiD
nth Jlu1ay Hatld to overthrow the Su11;an in 1908.' It

.

~LUI

little 'Cd.••

how.....r .. betor. the 11_ Sultan alao tUJ"l1l4 to the European. with teJ"JU

.t

oODOtt.l1onl, and agab the na1;1v8. rebeUed. When he triM to ral.. are
moll87 by 1;axing the nat!ve. to pay an ln41D1111ty to 'ranOtt tor the Vouble ai;,
Ca_blanca.. the aapUJol wu at. .ked and the Sultan a.ked the rrenoh tor

m1U tary help.

The henoh ".ponded by di.patoh1ng ten thouaand. meD to oco1lP7

i;he oapitol al'ty

ot Fe.. In ezplainlDg their laten aotloll,

the FFeoh

deolared that .uob aot10l1 ft. n.....ary to eateguard the live, of Eul"Opeau L.

F•• againn attaokl by the natd.ve •• 1
In the ...-hile, 1:11e pa••ive attitude ah1blted bY' the GeftlaD. 'book

on a d1tteren1; oharaoter.

»e.erterl trOlll the Frenlth tONten legion were Mill,

enoourage4 and helpe4 out ot Ca.abl_oa by a Gel"1DU orgenta.tie w1l1h 1;11.
lmowledg. ot the GUll. eolUtul. !'he plan

de.enerl, along w11;b

10_

ft.

not; IUCO'lllul, though, md th4t

ot 1;be Ge:r.at.an., were 8I'",..lted. 6 'or. while

U,

looked a. it war mtght develop tl-om thil 1noldent, beoau.e the German. dAIuI14
8D

apology.. tbe rel..se ot the de.erter. and oompeuatlon tor tbe rough

ri....

,

~.!!.!:!

6

Cooke anc1 Stiokney, 114.
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January 12, 1908.

September 17. 1908.
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~

In tlbelr ".rela. 1t

watt • •

The ""_. auppo~ by Eqlalld u4

au.ta.

tr...... given '0 the1r oap4nu-e4
lnault

w the

0..... fl ... •

relwln to meet thoee
W 1Jhe Hap.

4eemt..

The whole prob1• •t .01.....

tnbunal. wb10b found the G,,.. pllty of

the FPftuh pl1ty 1n DOt

ru8

~1rtg

bJ pNnntlq So"

a14ing d............

-

1m. . . heM FoteotlOB __N1. . by ,be

latter 01"1.18 occurred 1Il 1109

8.Ild DO ~l' trouble 4eft1o,..

unb11 the Fnuh ooouplod the otty of I'e. ita 1911. Apla the GfmIau

pme_ed, --1dn&. "•••

ehould ,"-nee o..,..,..t;ep

t}w

UlIlt. of the apeolt1e4

pJ'O~• • • we ehoul4 epa olaim our full ~_ ot ~1.... ·8
!hNe aoatha 1.... the b'enoh att4 Span1. oooups._ the 01 t7 aD4 the

o.naau
DO

~

tho Fna.. had aoiled ap1net the Aot of Algeolrat. S1ft. .

r.,00_t1_ wu given to ill.

dtel.aNts._.

~ begaD

to

to~

....

plait, wtd.h she pnHll'MdthJtouch 'bhe Geran tore1p mlldmr, BtlerleD-

fh4t plan ooMined of ttuoee ftepa. the tlrn ftl to altc the

WMoh1ier.

h_ loBI they latenW to ""1 Sa

tor

~.

It tbey _"' go1Dg to

Alpol.... Aot.

l'.AItly.

ooapeaatlon..

"

r...

~

atar,

Fro_

!he IROftd . . to ~ ~'1"

HoaUM tbt . . . a violatt. of the

would . . . a WVIhlp to Aga41r u,*11 the

tOl"fJho~."

Ch!!!e 1'ri~. 1IIIi\y IS, 1909.

8 Cooke ar.t.cl ftle1c:aey. 1".

Co.. 1911. IV. T.I.
,

and

b

Ecip?

~'. ~ Dl:2~'le DoOUMlltll,

LoDdDa, i&fthuAm

On Jul,. 1, 19U the GeJ".lllU1 gunboat, Panther, atatiOl1ed it,elf at

Age,4ir and IUge_ated tha1s the Frenoh Congo, trOJA 1she
....oout, be giTIn to Gel"JUll1.

S..,.

:alver to the

Franoe retu." the plan, adding tha1s thq

wou14 not con.ider the prope.al ft'en it

Ge~

thr_ in her oolOJl)l' of

togeland and part of the Cameroon•• 10
Ge~

.

had _t reokoned with the polaible &Otton of Eng1ed, wb1eh

oame almolt 1:mmediatel,.. Eng1aad feared that 'bheir naval plan. would be
hindered 'by the pre.enee of Ge:rman boat. In 'bhe.e water. J
Gel'DYU1)l'

10

i;he,. amed

'bhat auGh methodl would be _barralaing to her. it i;hq oont1JN.e4,

and 'but auoh embanas.ent would not be tolerated. 11

I1der1en-Waeohter fiDall,. withdrew hia original plaB in Ootober,
and on November 4th, 1911 the tollowing agre. .n'b waa reached.

Franoe waa t.

be allowed to interve. in IIoroooo, onoondltlon that all nations ehoulcl

enj07 equaUty a. regards ounmu, 'barllt., 'bre.naporbation chargee and mining
the iron "eour..a of 1Ioroooo were to be .ett1ed by statlng 'bhat no tax Ru14
be lald on the export of iron ore.

GeJ"JDaD1' was to reoeive 100,000 equare

mile. of heneh Congo.12
Ger.lDllllJ.y

wa. net at all ...tlafied, but a. the ltai.er

had .aid

earlier 1n .eoret documenta,
the wrnohe4 Morooco aftair muat be brought to a oloae, quiokly and

10 Gooch, 4?9.

11 Oooke and Stiokney. 186.
12 Erich Brandenburg, FI"OJI'l Bi ......ok
Oxford UDlverlit,. Pr'aa, 1927, 38~

!!. ~ World War.

London,

14
tlully. io'bhUlg oa.tl b. don., .J"OOoo will b.... Frtmoh. 80 gM ouiJ
~ the altalr graoef'ull.,', in ol"4er that . . mar n 1aft .114 the Met!oa
wlth :rranoe, aow. when great qu.stion. are .t . . . .11

SaYlal r8I&We<t the
the J'Nnoo-8pe.nlah trea'b7

OIl

a.,.,. oppol1ttoD at

lut, FftUl" nat ooul4ere4

Bovcbe:r 27, 1911. !Me tHaty ino1wt. 1lbe

tollowlag ,."11101'18'

ooan, about

1. The l101"1ahen

20Q mil.. loac 8I.l4 60 1111•• 4eap, . . en

apan .. a "Span1. aone,- 'b7 .. l1 _ _ _t of the Butta, W!Ida' 1Jhe
eupen1a1on .t .. Spanlah lftgh Oommlulonft>.

I. SpaiD._ to .....1....... p1.... of twrltoJ'y in tbe Sou.... _Id.a,
.. towl of t.bout 18.rK» Iqu8H JIll... or .... ut; oa. . . .1fth of tilt. IforoooeD
aa4 .....eMh of the 'IIoI"o008ll pepulatlOD..
I. TlII'lgtor 8b4 140 aqU&H tdl•• ot aun"OutwSlng t..n.tory
1;0 be

ar...

'ft'

iDteraatlonal1....

4. The nft t4 the terr1toJy._ to be the Frene IOne. 1t

111.. 1n the J'renoh plan ttll' Mol'Ooco, and that

0. tmal nep ....

coulated ot ma1d.ng • ",..t,' with the Sultan. Thi. wa_ euooe••tully
aoocaplllhe4 on ..,..h 10, 1918 when the Sultan agrMd 'bo a lnAoh
OIl

pJ"OWo~.

the oon41tion that he be ,.et;a1u4 . . the nominal ruler. ll Another

rebell101l followed when the lloroeotm pol!... _tWed end ld.UfJd eighty lTellOh-

me In Fe.. !hi.

ftl

put down

after some trouble end the , . .ott offered the

Sultan a pflnalQft ",0 N81&21. which he acoep1ied. an(l hi. brother Ifulay '!UHf'

8OGoeed_ to the 1.'hrcme.16 'lbe h4m.Clh Ina prartoUI experiet'JA.Mt thought lt
ben 'bo keep .. Datlve NI.r at the head of the pwrmunt in hopea of
paolfy1ng the native. ln that _,..

11 Moen. 110.
14 Amerlcu JoU1"tl&J.
15 .Alavi. .

16

J~

!!! l!.!J! f1M,s.

!! Intenational

Law, VII, 81.

!! Int....'lf11lA} !:!!r"

Auguet 12,

1912.

VI, IO?

76
The~f1nal

renouncaa«at ot aD1 German cla1m8 to IOrocco came in the

Veraal11e. treaty, when the German colonie. were taken ...y ttoa her.
thua ia conoluded • story of riYal imperlali_, which i8 .red!.t"
by

Ilf1Zly

hiatorians •• a cauae tor the Great War, which !nvolnd moat ot the

European oeuxrbrle. in etruggle for world domination in the early twentieth
oentury.

It was not jut e. oontUot ,between han.. and GeZ'Jlllln1 tor oontrol of

a north Atrican couatry, but an tnternational ori.i., reaultlng trom several
earlier alliance. and. .ecret proalse. of oompenaatlona to tho.e who "ere not
direotly involved.
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